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ARTICLES
IN  DEFENSE  OF  THE  FEE  SIMPLE
Katrina M. Wyman*
Prominent economically oriented legal academics are currently arguing that the fee simple,
the dominant form of private landownership in the United States, is an inefficient way for society
to allocate land.  They maintain that the fee simple blocks transfers of land to higher value uses
because it provides property owners with a perpetual monopoly.  The critics propose that landown-
ership be reformulated to enable private actors to forcibly purchase land from other private own-
ers, similar to the way that governments can expropriate land for public uses using eminent
domain.  While recognizing the significance of the critique, this Article takes issue with it and
defends the fee simple.
The Article makes two main points in defense of the fee simple.
First, addressing the critique on its own economic terms, the Article argues that the critics
have not established that there is a robust economic argument for dispensing with the fee simple.
The critique that the fee simple leads to the misallocation of land rests on three empirical premises
for which the critics have yet to provide much evidence.  The critique also downplays or overlooks
important economic benefits of the fee simple.
Second, departing from the economic discourse of the critics, the Article argues that the fee
simple is valuable because it gives landowners a perpetual right to choose, free from the dictates of
others, whether to transfer their land.  Thus the fee simple expands the choices of landowners and
promotes their independence and autonomy.  Eliminating the fee simple would leave landowners
vulnerable to the whims of others, and less free and autonomous.  Landownership is not only
about efficiency, but also about individual freedom.
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INTRODUCTION
There is an emerging critique of the dominant legal form of private land
ownership in the United States from a small number of economically ori-
ented academics associated with the University of Chicago.  According to this
“Chicago critique,” the fee simple is problematic because it allows landown-
ers to block, or raise the cost of, transferring land to higher value uses, since
fee simple owners have a perpetual “monopoly” on specific parcels of land
that enables them to “hold out” forever.1  Professor Lee Anne Fennell’s arti-
cle Fee Simple Obsolete offers the most forceful exposition of the critique.2  She
maintains that the fee simple, the main way of owning land privately in the
United States, is out of date and a barrier to efficient land use in the urban
areas where most people now live.3  This is so, she argues, because the fee
simple gives owners a perpetual veto over selling their land, and using this
veto, landowners can block or increase the costs of transferring land to
higher value uses.4  In an intellectually sympathetic article, Professor Eric
Posner and E. Glen Weyl (Posner & Weyl) similarly argue that “[t]he existing
1 See generally Lee Anne Fennell, Fee Simple Obsolete, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1457 (2016);
Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Property is Only Another Name for Monopoly, 9 J. LEGAL ANALY-
SIS 51 (2017).  Eric Posner is the Kirkland & Ellis Distinguished Service Professor of Law at
the University of Chicago Law School.  E. Glen Weyl, who is working on a book with Pos-
ner, is a Senior Researcher at Microsoft Research New England, and a visiting Senior
Research Scholar at Yale Department of Economics and Law School.  Lee Anne Fennell is
Max Pam Professor of Law and Ronald O. Coase Research Scholar at the University of
Chicago Law School.
Fennell and Posner & Weyl are not the first to describe property owners as enjoying a
monopoly.  For example, Posner & Weyl refer to Thomas Merrill describing property own-
ers as enjoying a monopoly. See Thomas W. Merrill, Private Property and Public Rights, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY 91 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E.
Smith eds., 2012).
2 See Fennell, supra note 1, at 1461.
3 Id.
4 Id. at 1463–64.
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system of private property” writ large impedes transfers of private property to
higher value uses, by giving owners “a monopoly” that they can use to thwart
or increase the cost of transfers.5  The ambit of Posner & Weyl’s argument is
broader than Fennell’s.  They argue that private property generally gives rise
to the holdout problem, whether the object of property is land, cars, the
spectrum, or something else.6  But the ability of landowners specifically to
block or raise the cost of transfers to higher value users is one of their central
examples.7  As Fennell illustrates, for land, the fee simple is the root legal
cause of the holdout problem that preoccupies Posner & Weyl, and so funda-
mentally, they too are critics of the fee simple.8
There is an ambitious reform agenda attached to the Chicago critique.
With the goal of promoting the reallocation of property through markets,
Fennell and Posner & Weyl recommend redesigning property rights.9
Although the details of their reform proposals differ greatly, both recom-
mend redesigning property rights to enable private buyers to acquire prop-
erty from existing owners without obtaining the owners’ consent or their
agreement on price.  Enabling private buyers to acquire property in this way
would straightforwardly reduce the transaction costs of land purchases by
entirely eliminating the need to bargain to transfer land.  In effect, Fennell
and Posner & Weyl would privatize eminent domain by transferring to pri-
vate parties a version of the authority of compulsory purchase that historically
has been the purview of public actors using eminent domain.10
5 Posner & Weyl, supra note 1, at 51.  Posner & Weyl expand on E. Glen Weyl &
Anthony Lee Zhang, Ownership of the Means of Production (Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law &
Econ., Working Paper No. 765, 2016).
6 See Posner & Weyl, supra note 1, at 51.
7 See id. at 52, 102; see also id. at 61 (“Real estate development is also hampered
because it requires the assembly of multiple plots of land whose owners hold out for high
prices.”).
8 To be clear, Posner & Weyl do not use the term “fee simple” to describe the legal
interest that they are critiquing; they criticize “private property.”  Posner & Weyl, supra
note 1, at 51.  However, Posner & Weyl are critics of the fee simple because they essentially
equate private property with perpetual ownership, and the fee simple is the legal interest
providing perpetual ownership of land.  Thus, they imply that a lease is not private prop-
erty. See id. at 52, 53, 63, 64, 69, 111. But see id. at 56, 98 (treating a natural resource lease
as private property that could be transferred under their approach).  Even if Posner &
Weyl would consider nonperpetual legal interests in land to be private property, their con-
cern that private property gives rises to holdout problems applies most aptly to the fee
simple because it is perpetual; the ability of landholders with shorter-lived interests to hold
out is lessened because their shorter interests will end.
9 See generally Fennell, supra note 1; Posner & Weyl, supra note 1.
10 Posner & Weyl refer to their proposal as “Harberger taxation with universal compul-
sory purchase provisions.”  Posner & Weyl, supra note 1, at 95.  Arnold Harberger “first
proposed” taxation based on owners’ self-assessed valuations. Id. at 54.
There are precedents for private actors exercising the power of eminent domain.
Eminent domain is in some instances delegated to private actors, such as utilities. See
THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1265 (3d ed.
2017); see also Abraham Bell, Private Takings, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 517, 545–46 (2009).
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The Chicago critique of the fee simple is theoretically significant
because it runs counter to recent property scholarship affirming the impor-
tance of a robust conception of private property.11  The critique is also timely
because there is considerable concern about rising housing prices and a lack
of affordable housing in many cities in the United States, especially along the
coasts.  A standard explanation for these rising housing prices among econo-
mists is that local governments are constraining the supply of land available
for housing through excessively stringent public land use regulation such as
zoning and historic preservation laws.12  The Chicago critics have not exten-
sively applied their critique to the problem of housing affordability.  But
their critique raises the prospect that part of the blame for high housing
prices may lie with the predominant form of land ownership in this country,
and that it is not only the public law of land use regulation that needs to be
reformed, but also the private law of property.13  By granting private land-
owners the right to refuse to sell their land, the fee simple, like land use
regulation, may curtail the supply of land available for redevelopment into
affordable housing.
This Article offers a defense of the fee simple.  I make two main points.
First, addressing the critique on its own economic terms, I argue that the
critics have not proven that there is a strong economic argument for replac-
ing the fee simple.  The critique that the fee simple results in inefficient allo-
cation rests on three empirical premises.  It assumes (1) that land currently is
misallocated on a sufficiently large scale to warrant the attention of policy-
makers, (2) that the misallocation of land is attributable to the fee simple as
opposed to other causes, and (3) that the benefits of replacing the fee simple
with any realistic version of the critics’ proposals will exceed the costs.14  But
the critics have yet to provide any meaningful empirical evidence for these
three propositions, and there are reasons for doubting whether any of them
hold up.  Moreover, the critique tends to discount, or ignore, several poten-
tial economic benefits of the fee simple.  As the critics mention, but tend to
downplay, the fee simple incentivizes investment.  It also promotes the trans-
fer of land, because it is comparatively straightforward to value, and it decen-
11 See infra note 82 (listing citations to the literature affirming a robust right of private R
property).
12 See EDWARD GLAESER, TRIUMPH OF THE CITY (2011); Ed Glaeser & Joe Gyourko, The
Economic Implications of Housing Supply, (Zell/Lurie, Working Paper No. 802, 2017), http://
realestate.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/802.pdf; Jason Furman,
Chairman, Council of Econ. Advisers, Remarks at The Urb. Inst., Barriers to Shared
Growth: The Case of Land Use Regulation and Economic Rents (Nov. 20, 2015).  For a
lucid analysis of the implications of the economic literature on why housing prices are
increasing in coastal cities like New York and San Francisco, and what policies affordable
housing advocates should be supporting in light of this economic literature, see John
Mangin, The New Exclusionary Zoning, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 91 (2014).
13 Fennell briefly alludes to the possibility that shifting to a shorter form of land own-
ership than the fee simple might increase the stock of affordable housing. See Fennell,
supra note 1, at 1512.
14 See Fennell, supra note 1, at 1477; Posner & Weyl supra note 1, at 60–61.
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tralizes decisionmaking to landowners with easy access to the information
necessary to manage the land.  Furthermore, it may promote respect for
property rights if we think of perpetual landowners as analogous to players in
an indefinitely repeated game.15
However, the benefits of the fee simple are not fully captured by eco-
nomic analysis and so my second line of defense of the fee simple departs
from the economic discourse of the Chicago critique.  In addition to its eco-
nomic advantages, the fee simple allows landowners to decide whether to
transfer their land to others and if so whether to sell it and at what price.
There are different ways of understanding why this right to choose whether
to transfer land to others is valuable.  One is that the right to choose whether
to engage with others protects us from the whims of others.  Another is that it
protects our ability to author our own lives, in turn protecting our autonomy.
To return to the economic language of the Chicago critics, the buyer of a fee
simple pays something like a “control premium[ ]” to obtain a legal interest
that leaves them as independent and autonomous as common law, statutory
law, and constitutional law allow.16
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I explains what the fee simple is
and distinguishes it from other legal forms of landholding.  Part II analyzes
the Chicago critique and the critics’ reform proposals, and underscores the
significance of the Chicago critique for theory and public policy.  Part III
argues that the critics have yet to provide robust evidence for their largely
theoretical economic critique of the fee simple.  In addition, it emphasizes
that the fee simple has important economic benefits that the critics tend to
downplay or ignore.  Part IV argues that the fee simple increases the range of
choices available to owners, and that systematically abandoning the fee sim-
ple therefore would undermine individual independence and autonomy.
The Article then briefly concludes.
It is important to take note of the Chicago critique, even if it is not ulti-
mately persuasive.  The critique correctly draws attention to the urgent need
today in many urban areas to repurpose land.  This is an important public
policy challenge, given that over eighty percent of the U.S. population, and
fifty percent of the global population, resides in urban areas.17  But the onus
is on the proponents of overhauling the fee simple to show that the fee sim-
ple needs to be rethought because it leads to a costly misallocation of land
that dwarfs the numerous other economic benefits of the fee simple.  Moreo-
15 I am grateful to Richard Revesz for suggesting this hypothesis.
16 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 10, at 567 (quoting Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Premiums in
Stock-for-Stock Mergers and Some Consequences in the Law of Director Fiduciary Duties, 152 U. PA.
L. REV. 881, 889 (2003)).
17 See Lisa Lambert, More Americans Move to Cities in Past Decade—Census, REUTERS (Mar.
26, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/usa-cities-population-idUSL2E8EQ5AJ201203
26; U.N. Dep’t of Econ. and Soc. Affairs, Population Div., World’s Population Increasingly
Urban with More than Half Living in Urban Areas (July 10, 2014), http://www.un.org/en/
development/desa/news/population/world-urbanization-prospects-2014.html; see also
Fennell, supra note 1, at 1461 nn.11–12 and accompanying text.
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ver, even if there were empirical evidence that fee simple ownership results
in a massive misallocation of land, I would still be concerned about aban-
doning this form of ownership because of the protection that the fee simple
provides against the whims of others.  Landownership is not only about the
efficient use of land, but also about individual freedom.
I. WHAT IS THE FEE SIMPLE?
I begin by analyzing what the fee simple is—and is not.  By fee simple, I
mean what is technically called the fee simple absolute.  This is a legal inter-
est in land that the United States inherited from England, where it developed
over hundreds of years after the Norman Conquest.18
The fee simple is the most important form of private land ownership in
the United States, with “[o]ver 99%” of privately owned land in the country
owned in fee simple.19  Like other legal interests in land, the fee simple pro-
vides a bundle of rights over a specific parcel of land.  The content of the
bundle of rights is defined by common law, privately agreed covenants
between landowners, community customs, and statutory, regulatory, and con-
stitutional law—and varies depending on the time and place.  The bundle
that any owner enjoys, whether they own in fee simple or not, typically
includes the right to exclude others from the land, the right to possess it, the
right to use and enjoy it, the right to sell the interest, the right to devise it,
and the right to pass it by inheritance.20
18 “The term fee comes from the Latin feudum or feodum, which originally simply meant
holding. . . . In the twelfth century the term fee came to be used to designate an inheritable
interest in land rather than a mere life interest.” WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHIT-
MAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 1.6, at 15 n.6 (3d ed. 2000) (citing A.W.B. SIMPSON, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF LAND LAW 3 n.4 (1961)); see also id. at 18 n.29 (“The
terms pure fee or fee simple came into use in the latter part of the thirteenth century to
designate an interest inheritable by collateral as well as lineal heirs, as distinguished from a
fee tail, which was inheritable only by lineal heirs (‘heirs of the body’).”).
19 JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW § 9.05(B)(1), at 109 (3d ed.
2012), quoted in Fennell, supra note 1, at 1458 n.1.  Perpetual land rights also are common
in other countries.  Robert C. Ellickson, The Costs of Complex Land Titles: Two Examples from
China, 1 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 281, 300 (2012) (“In virtually all of the
world’s most prosperous nations, perpetual private land rights are routine.”); Robert C.
Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1370 (1993) (“Perpetual private land rights
are most emphatically not a uniquely Western institution, however.  Land interests of
potentially infinite duration evolved separately among the Japanese, the Ibo of Nigeria,
and the Navajo of the American Southwest.” (footnotes omitted)).
While this Article focuses on private landholding, it is worth remembering that the
federal government owns “nearly a third” of the land mass of the United States.  Andrew
McGill, The Massive, Empty Federal Lands of the American West, ATLANTIC (Jan. 5, 2016), http:/
/www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/01/federal-land-ownership/422637/.  Most
federally owned lands are in the American West.
20 See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 18, § 6.67, at 379–80 (stating that tenant has
right to transfer lease, except for tenant at will); id. § 6.11, at 256 (“leasehold descends by
intestacy or may be willed to the same persons as may take freehold estates”); see also Wil-
liam G. Coskran, Assignment and Sublease Restrictions: The Tribulations of Leasehold Transfers,
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What distinguishes the fee simple from other interests in land is that the
fee simple is a legal interest of “potentially infinite duration.”21  A fee simple
can last forever because there is no end point built into the fee simple.  But
there is no absolute guarantee that the fee simple will endure forever, so it is
best understood as probabilistically perpetual.  A fee simple might end if the
landholder dies without any heirs, which technically means that the land-
owner dies without a will, and at death has no relative who can claim the
interest as an heir under the state’s intestate succession statute.  In this situa-
tion, the fee simple “escheats” to the state.22  Since it is rare that an owner
dies without a will or heirs, most fee simples have a high probability of being
perpetual.
Other interests in land have no chance of lasting forever, and are there-
fore likely to be shorter lived than the fee simple.23  Consider, for example,
22 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 405, 419 (1989); Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, Death of Lessee as
Terminating Lease, 42 A.L.R.4TH 963, § 2[a] (1985).  In the case of the leasehold, the above-
named rights often will be qualified by the terms of the lease.
21 STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 18, § 1.6, at 17.
22 See id. §§ 1.6, 2.2, at 17, 29.  “In states where tenure still theoretically exists, escheat
may be viewed as terminating a fee simple absolute; in states where land ownership is
allodial, however, the state merely takes the estate as ‘ultimate heir’ when it escheats.” Id.
§ 2.2, at 29.
In addition, the fee simple may end if the state exercises eminent domain.  There
seem to be two different views about whether the fee simple ends when the government
takes land owned in fee simple through eminent domain. See 3 JULIUS L. SACKMAN ET AL.,
NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, §§ 9.01, 9.02(9) (2006).  On one view, which seems to apply
when the federal government takes land through eminent domain, the previous fee simple
is extinguished and “a new title” is created.  United States v. 194.08 Acres of Land, 135 F.3d
1025, 1029 (5th Cir. 1998) (“The default rule in eminent domain is that a taking in fee
simple establishes a new title and extinguishes all existing possessory and ownership inter-
ests not specifically excepted.” (citing A.W. Duckett & Co. v. United States, 266 U.S. 149,
151 (1924))).
However, on the second view, eminent domain does not extinguish a fee simple, but
merely transfers the fee simple interest to the government.  Under this theory, the title that
the government acquires when it takes private property by eminent domain is “derivative”
of the title of the prior owner, and the government takes the property subject to the
“encumbrances” that burdened the earlier owner.  Cumberland River Oil Co. v. Common-
wealth, 350 S.W.2d 700, 702 (Ky. Ct. App. 1961) (quoting 3 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN
§ 9.01 (2d ed. 1917)); see also John Edward Cribbet, Concepts in Transition: The Search for a
New Definition of Property, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 26 (referring to eminent domain as involv-
ing the transfer of a fee simple to the government).
As Fennell mentions, property owners can lose their land not only when the govern-
ment takes it through eminent domain, but also when they do not “pay [their] mortgage
or property taxes, [and they] might also be dispossessed by . . . natural disasters, or private
lawlessness.”  Fennell, supra note 1, at 1470 n.49.  Though the property owner changes
when the land is forfeited for the lack of payment of mortgages or property taxes, I do not
believe the fee simple ends in these instances.  I also presume that dispossession due to
natural disasters or private lawlessness does not end the fee simple.
23 Raffaele Caterina, Setting the Scene, in TIME-LIMITED INTERESTS IN LAND 4 (Cornelius
van der Merwe & Alain-Laurent Verbeke eds., 2012) (“The time-limited interest is thus
seen as an estate in land, which differs from the perpetual fee simple only in quantity.”).
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the lease, the principal alternative way of holding land today in the United
States and elsewhere.24  In China and Israel, for example, most privately
owned land is leased from the state, not owned outright under a perpetual
interest such as a fee simple.25  A leading property treatise defines the lease
as “a possessory estate in land for a determinate period or at will by permis-
sion of another, the landlord, who holds an estate of larger duration in the
same land.”26
It is important to recognize that the bundle of rights that the fee simple
entails is not unlimited when one looks at dimensions other than time.  Prop-
erty rights generally, including the fee simple as well as other interests like
leases, are limited along many dimensions by common law, statute, regula-
tion, constitutional law, and privately agreed covenants.  For example, the
common law of nuisance, and land use regulations such as zoning, limit what
uses an owner may make of land owned in fee simple, and therefore qualify
the right to use and enjoy land.  So, though the fee simple is often defined as
“full ownership of land,” ownership by way of fee simple does not grant abso-
lute authority over land.27
24 MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 10, at 643; STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 18, § 2.2,
at 32.
25 On landownership in China, see Donald Clarke, China’s Stealth Urban Land Revolu-
tion, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 323, 329–30, 358, 365 (2014) (approximately 60% of state-owned
land in urban areas is leased out by local governments under long-term leases; arguing that
the rights of leaseholders likely will evolve—and already may have evolved—to being de
facto perpetual, akin to the fee simple, because economic and political considerations will
induce governments to renew leases for free); Ellickson, The Costs of Complex Land Titles,
supra note 19 (critically analyzing the “fixed-term contracts” used to allocate land in China
and arguing that they are less efficient than perpetual landholdings like the fee simple);
Shitong Qiao, The Evolution of Chinese Property Law, in PRIVATE LAW IN CHINA AND TAIWAN
182, 189 (Yun-chien Chang ed., 2016) (urban and rural land use rights in China “are cre-
ated by contracts between land owners and corresponding land users, and are still far from
fee simple”).
On the legal character of land ownership in Israel, see Joshua Weisman, Long-Term
Leases as an Alternative to Ownership, in PROPERTY PROBLEMS FROM GENES TO PENSION FUNDS
105, 106 (J.W. Harris ed., 1997).  “[A]bout 92 per cent of the total area of the State” of
Israel is made up of Israel Lands, which are “lands owned by the state, by the Developing
Authority and by the Jewish National Fund.” Id. at 106 n.3.  Leases generally last for forty-
nine years, “with an option of a one time renewal for another term of 49 years” and in
practice leases are renewed when they come up for renewal so that the effective term is
generally ninety-eight years. Id. at 112.  Long-term leases also are used in “the Australian
Capital Territory (Canberra), Singapore, [and] Hong Kong.” Id. at 105.  Hong Kong’s
land tenure system is “the major model for China’s urban land tenure system.”  Clarke,
supra, at 345.
26 STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 18, § 6.1, at 244 (defining the interest held by a
“tenant”).
27 Id. § 2.1, at 26.  Full ownership is to be contrasted with a tenure system, under
which land is held of someone higher in a hierarchy in exchange for services or rent.  “The
essence of tenure is that one person holds an estate of or under another person and owes
the other continuing or recurring duties, such as the payment of rent, during the duration
of the estate.” Id. § 6.13, at 257.  “[A]ll land in [feudal] England except the King’s
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To make this rather abstract legal description of the fee simple some-
what more concrete, imagine two adjoining townhouses in the West Village
neighborhood of Manhattan in New York City.  Jane owns the first townhouse
in fee simple; Robert is a tenant leasing the second townhouse for a term of
two years from a landlord who owns it in fee simple.28  Jane and the fee
simple owner of Robert’s townhouse own the surface of the land, and to
some depths underneath and height above the land.29  Although Jane does
not have unlimited authority over her townhouse, she has a more robust bun-
dle of rights than Robert because she has a perpetual interest.  The fact that
Robert has a two-year lease not only means that his access to his house is time
limited, but many of his other rights to the house also are circumscribed, in
order to protect the reversionary interest of the fee simple owner.  For
example:
Jane has the right to exclude others from her townhouse.  While Robert
also has the right to exclude others, leases often will give the landlord “a
privilege to enter for stated purposes.”30  Even if no privilege to enter is spec-
demesne land was held of some lord, and ultimately of the King, in return for service of
some kind.” Id. § 1.6, at 16.  “Demesne” is “land held in one’s own right, and not through
a superior.” Demesne, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  Tenure either does not
exist in U.S. states or exists only “theoretically” and has “little or no practical significance.”
STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 18, § 1.8, at 21.  Thus, land is effectively owned “allo-
dial[ly].” Id.; see also id. § 2.2, at 29 (recognizing that there may be states where land is not
owned allodially, but this has only theoretical significance).
28 Many New York City single-family homes are owned in fee simple. See, e.g., Donna
Stockman, Forms of Ownership in NYC, SOTHEBY’S INT’L REALTY (2012), http://www.donnas-
tockman.com/for-purchasers/forms-of-ownership-in-nyc/.  Cooperatives and condomini-
ums are other common forms of ownership in New York City.  Cooperatives and
condominium buildings usually are built on land owned in fee simple, but there are some
that are built on leased land.  Julie Satow, Rising Costs a Concern for Land-Lease Building
Owners, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/realestate/ris-
ing-costs-a-concern-for-land-lease-building-owners-in-new-york.html?_r=0 (“Approximately
100 buildings in Manhattan have land or ground leases, according to several people in the
real estate industry.  They are mostly co-ops, although the list includes some
condominiums.”).
Battery Park City is one area of New York City where buildings are built on leased
land, not land that is privately owned in fee simple.  The land in this area is “leased
through 2069” by developers from the Battery Park City Authority, which has “a master
lease for 92 acres of landfill on the Hudson River.”  Charles J. Urstadt, Op-Ed, Riches Lie
Beneath Battery Park City, CRAIN’S (May 11, 2014), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/
20140511/OPINION/140509823/riches-lie-beneath-battery-park-city; see also Mitchell Hall,
Battery Park City, N.Y.C. BLOG ESTATE (May 22, 2007), http://www.nycblogestate.com/
2007/05/bpc.html.
29 See 1-6 WARREN’S WEED NEW YORK REAL PROPERTY § 6.09 (Lorraine Power Tharp ed.,
5th ed. 2017); see also Macmillan, Inc. v. CF Lex Assocs., 437 N.E.2d 1134, 1137 (N.Y. 1982)
(referring to ad coelum principle).
30 STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 18, § 6.22, at 271.
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ified, “it has been held that the landlord may enter to collect rent and to
distrain where that is permitted.”31
Jane has the right to make many choices about how to use her
townhouse.  She can decide whether to plant flowers in the front or the back,
have friends over to spend the night, and sleep upstairs or downstairs.  But
her choices are constrained.  For example, she cannot own and raise pigs in
the backyard because of Health Department rules and probably the common
law of nuisance.32  She may not be able to use the house for tanning hides,
because of an old covenant that still runs with the land.33  She probably can-
not knock down the townhouse and build a fifty-story office building because
of the zoning in the area.34  If she wants to build such a building, she likely
will have to seek an upzoning, which will require a lengthy approval pro-
cess.35  Moreover, she may actually be under an affirmative obligation to
maintain the house, because the townhouse, like many buildings in the West
Village, may be landmarked or part of a historic district.36  The historic pres-
31 Id.  Distraint is an old common law right of landlords “to enter the demised prem-
ises and to seize goods found there for the collection of unpaid rent.” Id. § 6.57, at 365.  It
does not exist in many states, and where it exists it is typically regulated by statute. Id.
32 See New York City, N.Y., 24 Health Code § 161.01(a)(1) (2017) (prohibition on wild
animals); Id. § 161.01(b)(15) (defining pigs as wild animals); Reuven Fenton, Hey, NYC—
What’s the Pig Deal?, N.Y. POST (Feb. 18, 2013), http://nypost.com/2013/02/18/hey-nyc-
whats-the-pig-deal/; Andy Newman, Pet Pigs of New York: Illegal, Embattled, Beloved, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/19/nyregion/illegal-but-still-
around-new-yorks-hidden-network-of-pet-pigs.html (discussing how people keep pet pigs in
New York City despite health code ban on pigs).  Owning certain animals—or large num-
bers of animals—within urban areas also might constitute a nuisance or violate zoning
laws.  For examples from other jurisdictions, see Murphy v. Hitchcock, 268 N.Y.S. 385 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1934) (finding a dog kennel in Mount Pleasant, Westchester County, New York, a
nuisance and violation of restrictive covenants); J.D. VANCE, HILLBILLY ELEGY: A MEMOIR OF
A FAMILY AND CULTURE IN CRISIS 31–32 (2016) (suggesting that zoning laws in Middletown,
Ohio, may have prevented people from owning chickens).
33 Elizabeth A. Harris, At High-Priced Corner, a Building Forlorn, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/26/nyregion/former-village-dispensary-must-
untangle-restrictions.html?_r=0 (stating that bans on “blacksmithing” and “the tanning of
hides” are “two restrictions that survive on many New York City deeds today”).
34 On zoning in Greenwich Village, see generally, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, Far
West Village Zoning Proposal—Approved! (2005), http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/planning/
download/pdf/plans/far-west-village/farwestvillage.pdf (describing zoning proposal
approved by City Council in 2005 and history of zoning in Greenwich Village); Far West
Village Contextual Rezoning Approved, CITYLAND (Nov. 6, 2010), http://www.citylandnyc.org/
far-west-village-contextual-rezoning-approved/; Danielle Tcholakian, Here’s How the City
Council’s Zoning Changes Affect the Village and SoHo, DNAINFO (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www
.dnainfo.com/new-york/20160315/west-village/heres-how-city-councils-zoning-changes-
affect-village-soho; GREENWICH VILLAGE SOC’Y FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION, http://www
.gvshp.org/_gvshp/index.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2017).  Zoning for specific addresses
can be accessed through Find Your Zoning, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, https://
www1.nyc.gov/site/planning/zoning/index-map.page (last visited Sept. 22, 2017).
35 A variance seems unlikely to be granted.
36 According to the Real Estate Board of New York, over 70% of properties in Commu-
nity District 2, which includes Greenwich Village, the West Village, and SoHo, are
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ervation laws may require her to get the approval of the City’s Landmarks
Preservation Commission if she wants to change the windows on the
house37—and she is not entitled to compensation for the burdens that the
historic preservation laws impose, because of the Supreme Court’s decision
in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.38
As a tenant, Robert has a right to use the townhouse subject to the same
city laws and common law rules as the fee simple owner.  But he is also bound
by the use restrictions imposed by the lease and by the common law of waste,
nuisance, and negligence as a backstop to protect the reversionary interest of
the fee simple owner.39
Jane has the right to sell the townhouse and to determine the price at
which she sells.  She also has the right to decide not to sell the house.  Robert
can sell his leasehold interest, but he can only transfer what he has—the two-
year term.  Also, the lease may restrict the right to transfer the lease, for
example by requiring the landlord’s prior approval.40
Jane can will the townhouse to her partner upon Jane’s death, or not
write a will and let the house pass by New York State’s intestate succession
statute.41  Jane’s successors can do likewise in perpetuity, and neither the
government nor another private owner will retake the land, assuming that no
owner dies without heirs.  Robert can will his lease or it can pass by intestate
succession, but again, Robert can only transfer what he has, which is the two-
year interest.42
There is a slim chance that the New York City government might seek to
acquire Jane’s and Robert’s townhouses by eminent domain.43  Because of
landmarked. REAL ESTATE BD. OF N.Y., AN ANALYSIS OF LANDMARKED PROPERTIES IN MAN-
HATTAN 5 tbl.1 (2013), https://members.rebny.com/pdf_files/Research_Analysis_of_Land
marked_Properties_in_Manhattan.pdf.
“Landmarks are . . . required to be maintained in a condition of good repair.” N.Y.C.
LANDMARKS PRESERVATION COMM’N, VIOLATIONS, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/lpc/viola-
tions/violations.page (last visited Sept. 22, 2017); see also New York City, N.Y., 25 Code § 25-
311 (Maintenance and Repair of Improvements).
37 See N.Y.C. LANDMARKS PRESERVATION COMM’N, THE DESIGNATION PROCESS, http://
www1.nyc.gov/site/lpc/about/the-designation-process.page (last visited Sept. 22, 2017);
see also Jim Rendon, High-Mileage Alterations, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2013), http://www
.nytimes.com/2013/06/23/realestate/high-mileage-alterations.html.
38 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
39 See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 18, §§ 6.22–.24, at 271–75.
40 See id. § 6.67, at 379–87.
41 See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1 (McKinney 2015).  For an interesting
story about an unsuccessful effort to will a West Village townhouse, see Sarah Maslin Nir, A
Brownstone and the Bitter Fight To Inherit It, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2016), http://www.nytimes
.com/2016/10/24/nyregion/a-brownstone-and-the-bitter-fight-to-inherit-it.html?_r=0.
42 See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 18, § 6.85, at 406–07.
43 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Use and Limits of Self-Valuation Systems, 81 U. CHI. L.
REV. 109, 124–25 (2014) (describing government taking of “residential facilities” through
eminent domain as an event of “extraordinary low probability” (citing Ilya Somin, The
Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2116–19
(2009))).
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the West Village’s location near the Hudson River, these houses may sit in a
floodplain, and the government might decide that the houses need to be
replaced with dunes to protect other properties in the area.  Dune construc-
tion likely would constitute a “public use” for which the government constitu-
tionally could use eminent domain, provided it pays “just compensation.”44
As a fee simple owner, Jane would be constitutionally entitled to the “fair
market value” of her perpetual interest.  If the government expropriates Rob-
ert’s house, the government must compensate the fee simple owner.  Reflect-
ing his lesser legal interest, Robert only gets compensated if the value of his
remaining lease term exceeds the remaining rent that Robert owes his land-
lord under the lease.45  To be sure, Jane and Robert could try to organize
their neighbors to oppose the expropriation, but political action to defeat
infrastructure, which has a celebrated history in the West Village, is costly in
time and money.46
In sum, the fee simple owner, but not the tenant, has “full ownership”
and “the largest possible aggregate of rights, privileges, powers and immuni-
ties with respect to the land,”47 to quote a treatise definition of a fee simple.
But even the fee simple owner certainly does not have absolute, unlimited
authority over the parcel of land that she owns.  The limitations on the
townhouse fee simple owner may seem extreme—and it is likely that a ranch
owner in rural Colorado who also has a fee simple is much less restricted in
what they can do on their land.48  But the townhouse fee simple owner is
more apt to keep in mind for present purposes, because the Chicago critique
has the most force when it implies that fee simple owners in densely popu-
lated areas like Manhattan have so much power that they can block higher
value uses of land.
44 Under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the government can use emi-
nent domain only to take property for public uses, and it must pay just compensation for
property taken. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
45 STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 18, § 6.35, at 287 (“It is agreed all around that if
the demised land is wholly taken by eminent domain, the leasehold and all duties under
the lease, including the tenant’s duty to pay rent, are terminated. . . . The nearly universal
rule is that the condemnor pays only one award, as if the fee simple title were not subject
to the leasehold; i.e., the leasehold and the reversion are not valued separately.  To the
extent the tenant has a ‘bonus value’ in the leasehold, i.e., the sum by which the fair
market value of the leasehold for the remainder of the term exceeds the cost of the ten-
ant’s obligations under the lease, the tenant is entitled to share.” (footnotes omitted)).  If
the government expropriated only the lease, only the tenant would be compensated. See
id. § 6.35, at 288–89.
46 See, e.g., Anthony Paletta, Story of Cities #32: Jane Jacobs v Robert Moses, Battle of New
York’s Urban Titans, GUARDIAN (Apr. 28, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2016/
apr/28/story-cities-32-new-york-jane-jacobs-robert-moses (recounting the story of Jane
Jacobs’s mobilization of opposition in Greenwich Village to Robert Moses’s highway con-
struction plans and redevelopment proposals); see also ROBERTA BRANDES GRATZ, THE BAT-
TLE FOR GOTHAM: NEW YORK IN THE SHADOW OF ROBERT MOSES AND JANE JACOBS (2010).
47 STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 18, § 2.2, at 28.
48 See Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Strategy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2061, 2069 (2012).
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II. THE CHICAGO CRITIQUE AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE
This Part analyzes the Chicago critique of the fee simple, explains the
critics’ proposals for reforming land ownership, and identifies the signifi-
cance of the critique.
A. The Critique
The heart of the Chicago critique is that the fee simple leads to the
inefficient allocation of land because fee simple owners may strategically
thwart the transfer of land to higher value uses.  This is so because the fee
simple gives owners a perpetual right to refuse to sell their land and to set the
price of any sale.  (If the landowner has a shorter-term interest, such as lease,
the landowner’s right to refuse to sell is less consequential because it will end
once the interest ends.49)  Thus, a fee simple landowner like Jane can refuse
entreaties to sell from a potentially higher value user, like the developer of a
condominium building.  She might be a “sincere dissenter” who favors “more
Jane Jacobs and less Marc Jacobs” in the Village, or she might be a “strategic
holdout” who wants to extract a higher price from the developer and knows
that she has leverage because the developer needs her land.50  The Chicago
critics are most concerned with “strategic holdouts”—sincere dissenters actu-
ally may be the higher value users of land if we account for their subjective
valuation of their land.51
The Chicago critique emphasizes that the fee simple complicates bar-
gaining over land and generates transaction costs that thwart the assembly of
land to reallocate it to higher value uses.52  Fennell uses the language of
49 Posner & Weyl, supra note 1, at 52–53 (under Vickrey’s auction proposal, “users
would eventually be required to return property to the government,” and they therefore
“could not hold out for a monopoly price, or indeed sell their property at all”).  I say that
the leaseholder’s veto power is “less” consequential deliberately, because someone trying to
assemble land for development may have to buy out leaseholders, and if they do not want
to sell, the land assembler could have to wait many years if the leaseholders have long-term
leases.  For an example where a developer’s plans had to be altered, though they were not
ultimately frustrated, due to the actions of a leaseholder, see ANDREW ALPERN & SEYMOUR
DURST, HOLDOUTS! THE BUILDINGS THAT GOT IN THE WAY 33 (3d ed. 2011).
50 For the distinction between “sincere dissenters” and “strategic holdouts,” see ILYA
SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND: KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON AND THE LIMITS OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 92 (2015); Daniel B. Kelly, The “Public Use” Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A
Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and Private Influence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 29 (2006);
Steven Shavell, Eminent Domain Versus Government Purchase of Land Given Imperfect Informa-
tion About Owners’ Valuations, 53 J.L. & ECON. 1, 7–9 (2010); Somin, supra note 43, at
2116–19.
51 Posner & Weyl’s explanation of the Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem emphasizes
that the reason for inefficient allocation is the incentives of sellers and buyers to deviate
from their reservation prices to maximize their profit.  Posner & Weyl, supra note 1, at
61–62.
52 See, e.g., Posner & Weyl, supra note 1, at 79 (“One of the worst distortions in our
mind from monopoly power is not merely the reduction in turnover, but the time wasted
on bargaining.”).
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“externalities” in explaining the bargaining problems to which the fee simple
gives rise.  She suggests that the fee simple owner’s “veto power” can be
regarded as imposing the negative externality of excessively fragmented land-
holding, or, alternatively, as thwarting society’s ability to benefit from the
positive externality of land assembly and redevelopment.53  Posner & Weyl
describe the owner’s “monopoly” as a “transaction cost” that gives rise to
“allocative inefficiency.”54  Land is allocated inefficiently when there is a
party that wants to buy the land to put it to a higher-value use and the
existing, lower-value user is refusing to sell.55  They argue that the private
owner’s ability to thwart or raise the cost of transfers by demanding a higher
price than his or her reservation price results in this kind of inefficiency.56
As mentioned above, Fennell and Posner & Weyl describe the con-
tracting problems to which private property gives rise as stemming from the
“monopoly” that property owners enjoy.  A firm is usually said to be a monop-
oly because it is the sole seller of something.57  As the sole seller, the firm has
the power to sell goods “at a ‘monopoly price’, one above the minimum she
would be willing to accept for her asset, and thus the price she would charge
in a market where many individuals with similar valuations of substantially
identical property to the owner compete to make a sale.”58  When Fennell
and Posner & Weyl say that a property owner has a monopoly, they are pre-
sumably alluding to the facts that property law (1) assigns a landowner a
specific parcel of a good (land) whose overall supply is fixed; and (2) grants
that landowner the right to decide whether to sell or retain that parcel, and if
to sell, at what price.  Because the landowner is the sole potential seller of the
53 Fennell, supra note 1, at 1466–67, 1472.
54 Posner & Weyl, supra note 1, at 58 (“[T]he monopoly problem is a type of transac-
tion cost.”).
55 See id. at 61 (“A central economic problem in a variety of settings is that of ensuring
capital—including money, land, machines, and other assets—is allocated to its most pro-
ductive uses.  In traditional economic models, this problem is assumed away: capital assets
move to their most productive uses because the people or firms who can use it most pro-
ductively can pay the highest prices to buy it from those who cannot.  However, in the real
world this problem of allocative efficiency often takes center stage.”); see also id. at 62 (stat-
ing that “allocative efficiency” exists if the good is transferred from the buyer to the seller if
“the buyer values the good more than the seller”).
56 Id. at 52 (“Just like a normal monopolist, a property owner sets a price that approxi-
mates what the seller thinks that the likely buyer’s valuation or reservation price for the
property is.  Because some buyers will have a valuation that is lower than the announced
price but higher than the seller’s valuation, some efficient sales will be blocked or delayed.
This inhibits the allocation of property to its most valuable uses, a crucial component of a
successful market economy.”).
Posner & Weyl credit Myerson and Satterthwaite for “identif[ying] the monopoly
problem in a mathematically rigorous fashion, proving that private property was inconsis-
tent with allocative efficiency.” Id. at 57; see also id. at 61 (describing the Myerson-Satter-
thwaite Theorem, for which Myerson “won the Nobel prize”).
57 Edwin G. West, Monopoly, in THE WORLD OF ECONOMICS 475 (John Eatwell et al. eds.,
1991) (referring to the “modern meaning” of “monopoly” as “a single uncontested firm”).
58 Posner & Weyl, supra note 1, at 51–52.
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land over which they have property, the landowner can choose to demand a
price above their valuation of the land—or reservation price—to sell it.59
However, the landowner’s “monopoly” is only problematic if they are acting
strategically and demanding a price above their reservation price, and if
there are no competing, substitutable parcels of land.60  Fennell and Posner
& Weyl seem to assume that landowners often act strategically when bargain-
ing and that individual owners will often be able to hold up development
because developers often need to acquire specific parcels to proceed.  But
these assumptions could be contested.  Indeed, Posner & Weyl acknowledge
that they are departing from “the tendency of the law and economics litera-
ture to treat the monopoly problem as exceptional—justifying a limited num-
ber of legal exceptions to the dominant paradigm of private property.”61
B. Reform Proposals
Fennell and Posner & Weyl propose redefining ownership to overcome
the bargaining problems created by the veto afforded to fee simple owners.
The goal in both cases is to enhance market transfers of land (and other
goods, in the case of Posner & Weyl) from one private actor to another.  But,
notwithstanding the promarket framing of the proposals,62 the resulting
transfers could be nonconsensual and, from the current landowner’s per-
spective, analogous to eminent domain by a private, rather than a public,
actor.  This is because Fennell and Posner & Weyl propose mechanisms that
would allow a private buyer to force an existing owner to sell at a price that
might not match the value that the owner would accept at the moment of
sale.  So, while the stated goal of the proposals is to promote voluntary land
market exchanges, the proposals paradoxically would lead to more compul-
sory exchanges.63
As a thought experiment, Fennell proposes two new types of fees to sup-
plement, but not replace, the fee simple.  Under her proposal for callable
fees, local governments would designate large blocks of land as “callblocks.”
These callblocks would be privately owned by a developer or government
owned, presumably through a perpetual interest like the fee simple, although
59 Id.
60 On the importance of nonfungibility, see Posner & Weyl, supra note 1, at 63 (“The
monopoly problem is most serious when property is illiquid, which typically arises when
property is idiosyncratic.  Such property is hard to value because it cannot be easily com-
pared to other pieces of property.  Thus, it takes a long time for people to agree on a price,
if they agree at all, and in the process much effort may be wasted.  Artwork is highly illiq-
uid; houses are illiquid; pork bellies and ball bearings are liquid.”); see also Fennell, supra
note 1, at 1470, 1476, 1490.
61 Posner & Weyl, supra note 1, at 106.
62 Id. at 83 (describing their proposal as a “decentralized market solution[ ]”).
63 Posner & Weyl do not seem concerned about the prospect of expanding private
takings beyond the ambit of those that now occur under the guise of takings for economic
developments, in which governments take private property and then resell it to different
private owners in the name of promoting development. See id. at 106, 109.
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Fennell does not specify the form of the ownership of the callblock.64  The
callblock owner would carve out and sell parcels within the block to individ-
ual private owners for residences or businesses subject to a call option to buy
back all the land within the callblock at a “strike price” determined by a
defined formula, “after a specified interval has passed (such as ten or twenty
years), if certain verifiable conditions” were met, such as declining property
values within the block.65  The idea is that if developers hold land in large
callblocks, it will be easier to repurpose land over time, because they will not
have to assemble land from many private owners for a development site.
Although Fennell does not draw the parallel, her proposal might be analo-
gized to the way that land is held in many parts of London.  Many fashionable
parts of London have been owned by families for centuries, and the families
lease out the land they own, retaining considerable control over land uses
within their holdings through the leasing system.66  The leases may in effect
provide the families with a call option if they are dissatisfied with the existing
uses of the land.67
Fennell’s other proposal is for a “floating fee.”68  This proposal would
strike more at the heart of the fee simple than callable fees, which, as men-
tioned above, appear to be carved out of land owned perpetually in fee sim-
ple.  Floating fees would provide owners with “a portable claim” to land, but
not a specific parcel of land.  So, owners might initially be allocated one spe-
cific parcel, but then “[a]fter the relevant procedures are engaged for trig-
gering the readjustment mechanism,” the owner might be shifted to another
supposedly equivalent parcel to facilitate the redevelopment of the area they
formerly inhabited.69  Fennell envisages owners “opt[ing] into districts” with
floating fees, and owners potentially could decide that they would like to
relocate to another parcel.70  But having initially opted into the district, own-
ers might be forced to move, against their wishes, because certain conditions
have been triggered.71  Owners also might be required to relocate to an area
that they subjectively believe is not equivalent to their former space, because
the parcel is judged to be objectively equivalent.  As Fennell mentions, there
are real-world analogues to the idea of floating fees.  When redeveloping an
area, governments or private developers might grant the longstanding
64 Fennell, supra note 1, at 1482–85.
65 Id. at 1484.
66 See Géraldline Vessière, Who Owns London?, CANAL ORDINAIRE (Oct. 19, 2013),
https://canalordinaire.wordpress.com/2013/10/19/who-owns-london/; Who Owns
London—The Great Estates, FLATLIVING, http://www.flat-living.co.uk/lifestyle/438-who-owns-
london-the-great-estates (last visited Sept. 22, 2017).
67 Josh Loeb, Independent Hoteliers Fear Eviction as Billionaire Landlord Considers Plan To
Bring in Hotel Chain, WEST END EXTRA (Aug. 31, 2012), http://www.westendextra.com/
news/2012/aug/independent-hoteliers-fear-eviction-billionaire-landlord-considers-plan-
bring-hotel-ch.
68 Fennell, supra note 1, at 1465.
69 Id. at 1490.
70 Id. at 1491.
71 Id. at 1493 (discussing options for mitigating the need to move involuntarily).
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residents of the area spaces in the redeveloped area once the redevelopment
is complete.72  For example, in the redevelopment of Toronto’s Regent Park,
“Canada’s oldest and largest public housing community,” tenants have been
granted a “Right of Return” to units in the redeveloped area.73
Posner & Weyl propose a radical overhaul of ownership that would
replace the fee simple, not merely supplement it as Fennell would do, to
eliminate the need to bargain to transfer property.74  They propose to use a
tax-based approach, relying on a self-assessment mechanism of the sort that
has attracted a number of adherents in the legal academy, but is little used in
practice.75  Owners regularly would declare values for all their assets, includ-
ing land, to a government-run registry.  All assets, including land, would be
taxed, based on the owners’ valuations, at rates set by the government to
encourage asset sales and investment.76  Also, owners would be “required to
sell their property at these valuations to any buyer.”77  This last feature means
“that buyers can force sales—limiting a longstanding element of private
property, which is that the person who owns property keeps it until she con-
sents to sale.”78  Posner & Weyl envisage that the obligation to pay taxes on
self-assessed valuations will induce owners to state their true valuations and
72 Id. at 1490–91.
73 Navroop Tehara, Tenants’ Right of Return: Early Experiences from Toronto’s
Regent Park Redevelopment, iii (2015) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Univ. of Waterloo),
https://uwspace.uwaterloo.ca/bitstream/handle/10012/9739/tehara_Navroop.pdf; see
also Tim Alamenciak, Regent Park Residents Happier in New Units, TORONTO STAR (Feb. 19,
2014), https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2014/02/19/regent_park_residents_happier_
in_new_units.html; Zoe McKnight, Regent Park Residents Find Relocation Unfair, TORONTO
STAR (May 3, 2014), https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2014/05/03/regent_park_resi
dents_find_relocation_unfair.htm.  For other examples of land rights to some land, but
not a specific parcel, see Ellickson, The Costs of Complex Land Titles, supra note 19, at 298 & R
n.80.
74 Posner & Weyl, supra note 1, at 54-55.
75 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 43.
76 Posner & Weyl’s proposal builds on Harberger’s property tax proposal.  Posner &
Weyl, supra note 1, at 66–68.  Posner & Weyl, drawing on Weyl & Zhang, supra note 5,
argue that the tax rate needs to be set to reflect the need to induce resales of the good, and
investment in the good.  Posner & Weyl, supra note 1, at 68.  A tax rate set to induce
turnover alone will discourage investment in the good, by reducing the returns that the
owner enjoys from the investment. Id. at 68–70.  Thus different goods should be subject to
different tax rates, depending on the level of investment needed in the good and the need
to spur resales of the good. Id. at 73.  Goods that require investment to maintain their
value, such as cars, should be taxed at a lower rate than goods that require little ongoing
maintenance, such as the spectrum. Id.  When there is no need to induce investment in
the good, it should be taxed solely to induce the optimal rate of turnover in ownership. Id.
at 69.  Also, if it is feasible for government to “subsidize investment,” then the tax rate on
goods requiring such investment might not need to be reduced to incentivize investment.
Id. at 80.  The “turnover rate” is “the probability that a buyer who values the asset more
than the seller materializes in each period.” Id. at 67.
77 Posner & Weyl, supra note 1, at 54; see also id. at 66.
78 Id. at 54; see also id. at 69 (stating that under the proposal, “[p]eople are not so
much owners of property as ‘lessees’ from society, subject to a special kind of lease that
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not inflate them to ward off a sale or extract a monopoly price.  But the same
obligation to pay taxes on the valuation might induce the owner to state a
lower valuation than their true valuation if, for example, they are concerned
that they lack funds to pay the taxes.  The result could be that owners are not
only forced to transfer their property to others willing to pay their stated
valuation, but that the stated valuation undercompensates the owner at the
time of sale, meaning they are not indifferent to the forced transfer of the
property when it occurs.79  On the other hand, Posner & Weyl’s proposal
could be a boon to land developers, because it would avoid the need to bar-
gain with landowners to assemble land for developments.80
C. Why the Chicago Critique Matters
The Chicago critique of the fee simple is significant from a number of
perspectives.  For one, it is at odds with the dominant tendency in recent
terminates when a higher value user appears, whereupon the lease is automatically trans-
ferred to that user”).  They explain the reference to owners as lessees as follows:
Property owned under the Harberger tax regime is very like a leasehold.  We can
think of the owner’s property rights as those of a lessee where the lease provides
that the term is unlimited—that is, not for a definite period—but subject to ter-
mination whenever a third party offers to pay a higher ‘rent’ (i.e., tax) to the
landlord (the government), who exercises the right to reassign the lease to that
third party.
Id. at 111.
79 Posner & Weyl assume that even if the owner’s consent is no longer needed for a
sale, the owner is fully compensated at the time of the sale because the owner can update
his or her valuation at any time prior to the sale. Id. at 100; see also id. at 103 (“[P]eople
who deeply care about keeping their home can reduce the risk of a (private or public)
taking to an extremely low level by announcing a high self-assessment.”); id. at 108
(“[P]eople who develop a sentimental attachment to their car can register a higher self-
assessed valuation and pay the additional tax to fend off buyers.”).  Their discussion largely
ignores the potential that individual “self-assessed” valuations may not be fully informed or
fully independent of wealth considerations.  Thus they refer only in passing to the poten-
tial that a lack of liquid funds may influence people’s valuations in a scheme where they
are taxed on these valuations, and briefly suggest that a market might emerge in insurance
to “cover the tax payments in exchange for a share of the gains if the house were sold at
the going price.” Id. at 88; see also id. at 87 (“Some people may, after holding property for
an extended period of time, develop special attachments to it and yet not have sufficient
liquid assets to pay taxes to preserve it from being taken from them.”).
80 As Posner & Weyl explain:
A real estate developer interested in purchasing multiple plots of land could draw
a shape on a map and be immediately told the aggregate price of the whole
region.  This could be done for a variety of competing sites for a potential devel-
opment and the information could even be fed to an optimization engine to find
the lowest cost development site.  This could dramatically reduce the transaction
costs of property acquisition, and all this could be done without ever tipping off
owners to the buyer’s interest, as all prices would be posted on the electronic
cadaster.  The holdout problem, the bane of developers everywhere, would be
solved.
Id. at 78 (citation omitted).
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property theory to reaffirm a robust conception of private property.81  Since
the late 1990s, a number of property scholars have been concerned with reas-
serting the value of a full-bodied conception of private property.82  This con-
ception of property is sympathetic to the fee simple, because it provides
owners with a right to exclude others perpetually from their land, unless
exclusion violates common-law, legislative, regulatory, or constitutional
restrictions.  Henry Smith and Thomas Merrill, the most prominent of these
“new essentialist” scholars in the United States, offer economic arguments for
a broad right to exclude.  On the other hand, the Chicago critics are
deploying economic discourse toward the opposite end of weakening the fee
simple owner’s right to exclude.83  More recently, it generally has been the
skeptics of economic analysis of property rights who have argued for limita-
tions on the right to exclude, not economic analysts like Fennell and Posner
& Weyl.84
Aside from the repudiation of a current strand of academic theorizing
about property that it represents, the Chicago critique of the fee simple may
be relevant to an ongoing public policy debate about whether the obstacles
to assembling land for redevelopment in American cities are too great.  In
the nineteenth century, a major preoccupation of U.S. policymakers was allo-
cating English-style fee simple rights to lands that had previously belonged to
Native Americans.85  This was the era of settling the frontier, and forcibly
displacing Native Americans who had long inhabited the area.  By the middle
of the twentieth century, the era of disposing of federal lands and allocating
81 See, e.g., Katrina M. Wyman, The New Essentialism in Property (Oct. 10, 2017)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
82 See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property, Inviola-
bility, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593 (2008); Christopher Essert,
Property in Licences and the Law of Things, 59 MCGILL L.J. 559 (2014); Larissa Katz, Exclusion
and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275 (2008); Thomas W. Merrill, Property
and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730 (1998); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the
Right to Exclude II, 3 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 1 (2014); Thomas W. Merrill &
Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1849 (2007); Adam Mos-
soff, The False Promise of the Right to Exclude, 8 ECON. J. WATCH 255 (2011); J.E. Penner, The
“Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711 (1996); Arthur Ripstein, Possession
and Use, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW 156 (James Penner & Henry E.
Smith eds., 2013); Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691
(2012); James Y. Stern, Property’s Constitution, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 277 (2013); Eric R. Claeys,
Property 101: Is Property a Thing or a Bundle?, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 617 (2009) (reviewing
THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (1st ed. 2007)).
83 Posner & Weyl candidly admit that their proposal involves “the extinction of a sig-
nificant element of the right to exclude.”  Posner & Weyl, supra note 1, at 111.
84 See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 743 (2009).
85 “When the United States disposed of most of its public domain during the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, the land was almost always granted in fee simple
absolute.” STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 18, § 2.2, at 32; see also Jerry L. Anderson,
Britain’s Right to Roam: Redefining the Landowner’s Bundle of Sticks, 19 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L.
REV. 375, 418 (2007).
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fee simple landownership was largely over.86  In the twentieth century, and
even more so in the twenty-first, introducing new land uses requires changing
existing land uses.  This often entails assembling land which is already pri-
vately owned, redeveloping it, and then reallocating it to a different set of
private owners.  Thus, the great battles about land today in the United States
tend to be about how to repurpose land that is currently privately owned.
Most of these battles are occurring in cities, because that is where the vast
majority of Americans now live.87
Broadly speaking, there are two kinds of situations where people are
seeking to assemble existing privately owned urban land for redevelop-
ment.88  The first scenario involves what might be called “demand-driven”
land assembly.  Think of coastal cities such as New York: in these places, the
economy is growing, land prices are high, and there is considerable demand
from private sector actors to repurpose land to accommodate that economic
growth by building new office, commercial, and residential buildings.  The
second scenario is “supply-driven” land assembly.  Think of old industrial cit-
ies that are in economic decline, like New London, Connecticut, the subject
of the infamous decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Kelo v. City of New
London.89  In these places, land prices are low, there is ample supply of
underutilized land, and little existing private sector demand to repurpose
that land.  Local and state governments are seeking to assemble land to
attract private sector investment, and to thereby promote economic develop-
86 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 10, at 106 (“[T]he Taylor Grazing Act of 1934
closed all of the remaining public domain from further private entry (other than entry by
prospectors for mineral claims).”); see also CHRISTINE A. KLEIN ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW: A PLACE-BASED BOOK OF PROBLEMS AND CASES 82 (3d ed. 2013).  After the frontier was
closed, one-third of the United States remained federally owned, generally because this
land was thought to be “too valuable” to allocate to private owners or because it wasn’t
sufficiently valuable for private owners to want to claim it. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note
10, at 106.
87 See Fennell, supra note 1, at 1461.
88 The two scenarios are inspired by Mangin’s discussion of demand- and supply-
driven theories of gentrification. See Mangin, supra note 12, at 108.
89 545 U.S. 469 (2005).  Other examples of local governments using land assembly to
promote economic development in declining areas are Kansas City, Kansas, and Madison
County, Mississippi.  Brief for Nat’l League of Cities et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 23–28, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108).  On the plight of industrial cities in
decline, see generally Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118
(2014).
When New York City was in decline several decades ago, it also would have been an apt
example of supply-driven land assembly.  The construction of Lincoln Center, the revitali-
zation of Times Square, and the building of Metrotech in Brooklyn are all large projects
involving land assembly that contributed to the revitalization of New York.  For an interest-
ing discussion of these projects that refers to the role of eminent domain in achieving
them and includes a detailed discussion of the history of Metrotech, see Brief for the City
of New York as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 1–2, 14–18, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469
(No. 04-108).
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ment.90  This was the story in New London, where there were forces within
the city seeking economic development, and where the state governor, work-
ing through the New London Development Corporation (NLDC), hoped to
promote the economic revival of New London by redeveloping the Fort
Trumbull area.91
As mentioned above, one of the expected benefits of assembling land
and repurposing it in prosperous cities such as New York is greater availabil-
ity of land for housing.  In recent years, as housing prices have picked up
following the Great Recession, there has been growing public attention to
the high cost of housing in many urban areas, especially cities such as New
90 Moussa Diop et al. provide some empirical evidence “that states view takings [of
land] as a potent tool to spur economic growth.”  Moussa Diop et al., Public Use or Abuse?
The Use of Eminent Domain for Economic Development in the Era of Kelo 16 (Univ. of Conn.
Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 2010-28, 2010), http://web2.uconn.edu/economics/
working/2010-28.pdf.
91 See SOMIN, supra note 50, at 15–16.
Naturally, there are situations that lie somewhere between demand- and supply-driven
land assembly.  For example, a local government in a prosperous city like New York City
might seek to assemble land itself—or promote the private assembly of land—in a specific
area within the city that has not been booming, in order to promote the revitalization of
that area and meet some of the needs of the region as a whole.  This is part of the back-
drop to the development of Hudson Yards, currently “the largest private real estate devel-
opment in the history of the United States.” The Story, HUDSON YARDS N.Y., http://www
.hudsonyardsnewyork.com/about/the-story/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2017).  New York City
initiated the process of repurposing the area, initially with the goal of attracting the Olym-
pics. See Charles V. Bagli, From Ashes of Olympic Bid, a Future Rises for the Far West Side, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 27, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/28/nyregion/on-far-west-side-
bloombergs-failed-olympic-plan-spurs-development.html; The Mother of All Megaprojects,
CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. (Aug. 23, 2015), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20150823/
REAL_ESTATE/150829955/the-mother-of-all-megaprojects.
The most important distinction between demand- and supply-driven scenarios of land
assembly concerns the relative certainty of economic gains from the assembly.  When the
land assembly is driven by private sector demand, or governments in economically boom-
ing cities, there is a reasonable prospect ex ante that the expected gains will be realized.
When the assembly is driven by the supply of land, and in the service of promoting eco-
nomic development in a declining region, it is often uncertain whether there will be eco-
nomic gains from the land assembly.  In the Kelo case, the economic development project
was risky from the start.  The NLDC did not have a signed “development agreement” when
it expropriated the land parcels that prompted the litigation in Kelo.  As a dissenting justice
in the Connecticut Supreme Court observed, “the proposed development plan . . . flew in
the face of market conditions that made it unlikely that the city would be able to reap
significant economic benefits from the condemnations.”  SOMIN, supra note 50, at 30 (sum-
marizing Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 596–600 (Conn. 2004) (Zarella, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).  Although he did not prevail, and his court
and the Supreme Court upheld the condemnations as for a “public use,” this dissenter
proved prophetic: the redevelopment for which the parcels were expropriated never
occurred.  Charlotte Allen, ‘Kelo’ Revisited, WEEKLY STANDARD (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www
.weeklystandard.com/kelo-revisited/article/776021; Glen A. Sproviero, Eminent Domain,
Revisited, NEW BOSTON POST (Apr. 11, 2016), http://newbostonpost.com/2016/04/11/
eminent-domain-revisited/.
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York and San Francisco.  Housing is becoming increasingly costly not only for
low-income but also middle-income earners in these cities, and housing
affordability has emerged as an important political issue in local politics.92
Although there is some recognition that increasing demand to live in
urban areas may be a contributing factor, economists usually point to restric-
tions on land supply for housing as the explanation for the increasing cost of
housing in urban areas like New York City.93  Some of these supply con-
straints are due to the topography of the cities where there are high housing
prices.94  High-priced cities such as New York are surrounded by oceans, and
other coastal cities have mountain barriers that limit the room to build.95
Other supply constraints are due to regulatory choices, in particular land use
regulations, over which humans have greater control.  Since the 2000s,
Edward Glaeser and other economists have amassed an impressive array of
evidence that land use regulation is contributing to higher housing prices in
urban areas such as New York and Boston.96  Zoning, “parking requirements,
92 See, e.g., Maria L. La Ganga, Ordinary People Can’t Afford a Home in San Francisco. How
Did It Come to This?, GUARDIAN (Aug. 5, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/business/
2016/aug/05/high-house-prices-san-francisco-tech-boom-inequality; Housing New York,
N.Y.C. HOUSING, http://www1.nyc.gov/site/housing/index.page (last visited Sept. 22,
2017).
The high cost of housing in these areas has also attracted concern among economists
from a national perspective, with some economists arguing that the high cost of housing in
dynamic urban areas may be contributing to the entrenchment of economic inequality and
reducing national economic growth. See ENRICO MORETTI, THE NEW GEOGRAPHY OF JOBS
168 (2012); Conor Dougherty, Why Falling Home Prices Could Be a Good Thing, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/10/upshot/popping-the-housing-
bubbles-in-the-american-mind.html; Furman, supra note 12, at 3.  The concern is that high
housing costs are keeping people from less productive regions from moving to more pro-
ductive cities, and therefore impeding income convergence and dampening productivity
growth.
93 See Mangin, supra note 12, at 103.  Some suggest that demand to live in urban areas
may no longer be increasing exponentially. See Conor Dougherty, Peak Millennial? Cities
Can’t Assume a Continued Boost from the Young, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www
.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/upshot/peak-millennial-cities-cant-assume-a-continued-boost-
from-the-young.html.
94 See Albert Saiz, The Geographic Determinants of Housing Supply, 125 Q.J. ECON. 1253
(2010).  Mangin discusses the geographic constraints on supply. See Mangin, supra note
12, at 99 (citing Saiz, supra).
95 Saiz, supra note 94, at 1254.  As the effects of climate change increase, the availabil-
ity of buildable land may shrink further.  In coastal cities like New York, sea levels are
already rising and in several decades, parts of the city likely will suffer daily flooding.
N.Y.C. PLANNING, RESILIENT NEIGHBORHOODS: OLD HOWARD BEACH, HAMILTON BEACH,
BROAD CHANNEL 13 (2016) (“Hamilton Beach and Broad Channel are among the most
vulnerable inhabited areas [in New York City] in terms of future risk for daily tidal flood-
ing.”).  On New York City’s prospects in an era of climate change, see generally Andrew
Rice, When Will New York City Sink?, N.Y. MAG. (Sep. 7, 2016), http://nymag.com/daily/
intelligencer/2016/09/new-york-future-flooding-climate-change.html.
96 See, e.g., SANFORD IKEDA & EMILY WASHINGTON, HOW LAND-USE REGULATION UNDER-
MINES AFFORDABLE HOUSING (2015), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Ikeda-Land-
Use-Regulation.pdf; Edward L. Glaeser & Bryce A. Ward, The Causes and Consequences of
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setback requirements,”97 “minimum lot sizes and maximum density rules,”98
and smart growth requirements have been shown to constrain supply and
drive up the cost of housing.99  The same can be said for historic preserva-
tion requirements of the kind which have left large portions of Greenwich
Village landmarked.100  Informed by this research, economists and law
professors such as Fischel, Glaeser, Hills, and Schleicher have developed
novel proposals to generate laxer land use regulation, by changing the proce-
dures through which land use is regulated or the incentives of homeowners
who currently have strong incentives to support restrictive regulation.101
The Chicago critique is significant from a policy perspective because it
suggests that there is another legal barrier, apart from land use regulation,
that may be constraining the supply of land for housing in high cost cities:
the predominant fee simple form of ownership.  Neither Fennell nor Posner
& Weyl spell out in great detail the potential that existing property rights may
be contributing to high housing costs, and that altering the fee simple conse-
quently might help to lower these costs.102  But the hypothesis that the fee
simple increases housing costs is a logical extension of their argument that
private ownership currently inhibits transfers of land to higher value uses: by
granting landowners a perpetual veto power over the use and sale of their
land, the fee simple may increase the cost of, or entirely frustrate, land assem-
bly for more productive uses, which likely includes housing in high priced
cities.  The idea is that landowners, exercising the veto that the fee simple
Land Use Regulation: Evidence from Greater Boston, 65 J. URB. ECON. 265 (2009); Edward L.
Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, The Impact of Zoning on Housing Affordability (Harvard Inst. of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 1948, 2002), https://law.yale.edu/system/files/docu-
ments/pdf/hier1948.pdf; Scott Beyer, The Verdict Is in: Land Use Regulations Increase Housing
Costs, FORBES (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/scottbeyer/2016/09/30/the-
verdict-is-in-land-use-regulations-increase-housing-costs/#dbb2c484162a.
97 IKEDA & WASHINGTON, supra note 96, at 4.
98 Id. at 8.
99 For a literature survey, see id. at 15–18.
100 As mentioned above, according to the Real Estate Board of New York, over seventy
percent of properties in Community District 2, which includes Greenwich Village, the West
Village, and SoHo, are landmarked. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.  The same
report indicates that “27.7% of properties in Manhattan are landmarked.” REAL ESTATE
BD. OF N.Y., supra note 36, at 1; see also IKEDA & WASHINGTON, supra note 96, at 17 (citing
REAL ESTATE BD. OF N.Y., supra note 36).
On the implications of historic designations for housing prices, see Vicki Been et al.,
Preserving History or Hindering Growth? The Heterogeneous Effects of Historic Districts
on Local Housing Markets in New York City (Sept. 2014) (unpublished manuscript),
http://furmancenter.org/files/NYUFurmanCenter_HistoricDistricts_2014.pdf.
101 These proposals include home equity insurance (Fischel), “regulatory budgets”
(Glaeser), “zoning budgets” (Hills and Schleicher), and “Tax Increment Local Transfers”
(Schleicher).  For a summary discussion of these proposals, see IKEDA & WASHINGTON,
supra note 96, at 26–29.
102 However, Fennell does suggest in passing that “[t]he capacity to reconfigure and
repurpose property, possibly at higher densities, could add to the overall housing stock for
both tenants and buyers.”  Fennell, supra note 1, at 1513.
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provides, may be constraining the supply of land for new uses in a decentral-
ized and uncoordinated manner by refusing to sell or strategically bargaining
for prices exceeding their reservation price.103
A variation on the hypothesis is that the endless duration of the fee sim-
ple contributes to the public regulatory restrictions on land supply for new
construction, because the fee simple motivates homeowners to favor restric-
tions on the supply of land for new construction.  The logic is as follows.  The
endless duration of the fee simple likely increases the value of many homes
compared to the value that these homes would have if they were built on
leased land.  Homes built on leased land likely would be worth less than
homes built on fee simple land because of the risk that the land lease might
not be renewed and the risk of future rent increases.104  Next, inflated land
prices contribute to making many homes the most important source of
household wealth.  To protect this highly valuable asset, homeowners vote, or
participate in the land use regulatory process, to support regulations that
have the effect of restricting the supply of land for new construction that
might reduce their home values.105  Conversely, if the land underlying many
homes was leased, home values would be lower because of the risk of non-
renewal or future rent increases, homes would be a less important source of
household wealth, and homeowners consequently would be less inclined to
support supply restrictions to protect the value of their homes.
If we take seriously the hypothesis that the fee simple is constraining the
supply of land for higher value uses such as new housing, then we should be
looking at changing the form of land ownership, as well as land use regula-
tion, to increase the supply of land for housing and lower housing costs in
103 In New York City, “rent-regulated” tenants—who are not fee simple owners—have
legal rights that they may use to hold out for payments from developers eager to acquire
their properties for development. See Mireya Navarro, New York Builders Paying Huge
Buyouts to Tenants in Their Way, N.Y. TIMES (December 24, 2015), https://www.nytimes
.com/2015/12/25/nyregion/new-york-builders-paying-huge-buyouts-to-tenants-in-their-
way.html?_r=0.  In 2015, the press reported on a $25 million payment by commercial devel-
oper Tishman Speyer Properties to three tenants “in the path” of a “$3.2 billion tower.”
Id.; see also Daniel Geiger, Developer Pays Two Tenants $25 Million to Vacate Their Apartments,
CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20151005/REAL
_ESTATE/151009954/david-rozenholc-the-most-feared-tenant-lawyer-in-the-city-just-won-
25-million-for-a-client.  The press coverage of these buyouts suggests that it is not only the
nature of the tenancy, but also the legal processes available to protect it, that provide
tenants with leverage.  Generalizing from this example, we might hypothesize that it is not
only the legal form of landholding, but also the processes available to safeguard it, that
may complicate land assembly in dense urban areas.
104 See Satow, supra note 28 (stating that Manhattan apartments in buildings built on
leased land are cheaper than apartments in buildings that own the land on which they sit);
see also Clarke, supra note 25, at 333 & n.24 (discussing the discounted value of leased land
compared with land owned in fee simple).
105 On the significance of the home as an investment and the implications of this signif-
icance for land use regulation, see generally WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTH-
ESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND
LAND-USE POLICIES (2001).
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high priced cities.  If developers were able to assemble land more easily, and
zoning were less restrictive, then they might be able to construct more
housing.
To be sure, the idea that holdouts complicate land assembly is not
novel.106  Michael Heller, for example, has emphasized the potential for
property owners to complicate the repurposing of land.107  At the heart of
the debate following the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Kelo about how
easy it should be for governments to overcome holdouts was a discussion
about how cumbersome it should be for governments to force landowners to
sell.  Although it was not widely recognized in the debate surrounding Kelo,
the endless duration of the fee simple is an important legal reason that land-
owners have a powerful veto that leads to the use of eminent domain.108  If
landowners merely had a time-limited right to their land, then governments
could wait them out, especially if the interest was of short duration.
The Chicago critics, especially Fennell, deserve credit for drawing atten-
tion to a major legal source of the complications of assembling land through
market transactions, and for raising the question of whether that legal
source—the fee simple form of ownership—should be changed to facilitate
land assembly.  If the fee simple was reformed along the lines that the critics
advocate, the need for governments to use eminent domain likely would
diminish significantly.  But that is because Fennell and Posner & Weyl pro-
pose to allow private actors—as well as the public sector, presumably—to for-
cibly acquire land without resorting to eminent domain.  In their worlds,
forcible transfers of land likely would be much more common than in our
world, and not only public, but also private actors, would have the ability to
force landowners to transfer their land.  I now turn to whether their propos-
als for overhauling the predominant form of land ownership should be
pursued.
III. THE ECONOMICS OF THE FEE SIMPLE
The Chicago critique is an economic one and my first defense of the fee
simple is likewise from an economic perspective.  I question the claim that
the fee simple generates a sufficiently grave misallocation of land that policy-
makers should cast it aside.  Moreover, even if the fee simple causes land to
106 See, e.g., ALPERN & DURST, supra note 49, at 33.
107 See MICHAEL HELLER, GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS
MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES (2008); Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the
Anticommons: Property in the Transition From Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998).
108 For example, the term “fee simple” was not used in the amicus briefs of the Ameri-
can Planning Association or the National League of Cities in Kelo v. City of New London,
both of which underscored the importance of eminent domain for achieving local govern-
ment objectives.  Where amici did use the term, amici did not argue it was the root cause of
the holdout problem. See Brief for Property Rights Foundation of America, Inc. as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 15, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)
(No. 04-108); Brief for Reason Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at
10, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108).
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be inefficiently allocated, the fee simple has economic benefits that may can-
cel out its negative effects, and so the fee simple may still be welfare-maximiz-
ing, all things considered.
A. The Allocative Inefficiency Claim
As explained above, the crux of the Chicago critique is that the fee sim-
ple results in such a massively inefficient allocation of land to less productive
uses that we should reform the dominant form of landholding in the United
States.  There are three factual claims about the state of the world embedded
in this largely theoretical argument.  Neither Fennell nor Posner & Weyl pro-
vide much empirical evidence to support these propositions and there are
reasons to doubt them.109
First, the critique supposes that land is currently allocated inefficiently
on such a vast scale that there are significant social losses from this misalloca-
tion.110  One problem with this claim is that it presumes that it is self-evident
109 I say “much” advisedly.  Fennell points to empirical findings that higher prices are
paid for land that is being assembled for repurposing.  Fennell, supra note 1, at 1462 n.15
(“Recent empirical work has investigated land assembly frictions by examining the premia
paid for parcels that were destined for assembly. See Leah Brooks & Byron Lutz, From
Today’s City to Tomorrow’s City: An Empirical Investigation of Urban Land Assembly, 8(3) AM.
ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 69, 71–72 (2016) (finding, based on a dataset of 2.3 million parcels
in Los Angeles County over the period 1999–2011, premiums of fifteen to forty percent for
parcels that subsequently became part of a land assembly compared with land that was not
subsequently assembled); Chris Cunningham, Estimating the Holdout Problem in Land Assem-
bly 1–2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper No. 2013-19, 2013), http://papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2579904 (finding, using data from Seattle, that
subsequently assembled land sold for a premium of eighteen percent).”); see also id. at
1461 n.13.  However, evidence that land assemblers pay higher prices than individuals buy-
ing land is not the same as evidence that land is allocated inefficiently.  Land assemblers
likely are willing and able to pay more for the land than it is worth as is, because the land
presumably is more valuable to them when it is assembled into a larger whole.
Posner & Weyl estimate that their tax proposal will increase the value of “business
assets [by] . . . more than $2 trillion.”  Posner & Weyl, supra note 1, at 114.  This is a back- R
of-the-envelope-type estimate based on strong assumptions. See id. at 114–15; see also Weyl
& Zhang, supra note 5, at 31–32 (“We . . . would guess that 1% of national income or $150
billion in the United States, or roughly $1 trillion globally at purchasing power  parity, is a
good lower bound for the benefit of optimal Harberger taxation.”).  As Posner indicated to
me, Posner & Weyl’s estimates are based on the “time” that it takes to reallocate land
under the current legal regime, which is not exactly the same as the potential for gains in
allocative efficiency.
As Lee Anne Fennell helpfully suggested to me, one might debate how much scholar-
ship has to prove its claims and support its reform proposals.  Arguably the burden should
vary with the implications of the critique and the reform proposals.  Potentially, there
should be a lesser burden on scholarship such as Fee Simple Obsolete, which is merely propos-
ing to supplement the status quo, not to overhaul it as proposed in Property is Only Another
Name for Monopoly.
110 As mentioned above, Fennell points to empirical findings that higher prices are
paid for land that is being assembled for repurposing. See supra note 109.
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how we should measure whether land is efficiently used.111  But there are
different ways that land might be valued for determining whether it is misal-
located on a society-wide basis.  It might be valued objectively, much as real
estate appraisers currently assess land value, by trying to estimate the value-
maximizing use of the land using market values.112  Alternatively, we theoret-
ically might measure whether land is put to its highest and best use using
subjective preferences, by asking landowners and potentially nonlandowners
for their own valuations of land, and then determining the highest and best
use of land according to individuals’ subjective valuations.113  Even assuming
we settle on a definition of highest and best use to assess whether there is
indeed a massive misallocation, we must remember that perceptions of what
constitutes the highest value of use of land are not stable.  For example, think
back to the urban renewal programs on which cities embarked in the twenti-
eth century.  Planners proposed these projects believing that blighted areas
should be cleared and rebuilt anew, and renewal was judged to be the high-
est and best use of the land.  But within short order, many urban renewal
projects were judged wrongheaded, because they disproportionately dis-
placed racial minorities and low-income people, and destroyed neighbor-
111 The claim also presumes that efficiency is a desirable metric for evaluating land use.
Part IV, infra, discusses land in noneconomic terms.
112 Appraisals of this sort require determining the uses of the land that are physically,
legally, and financially feasible, and then selecting the use from among these that will
maximize market value.  For the definition of “[h]ighest and [b]est [u]se” in the Appraisal
Institute’s Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal, see James R. MacCrate, Part One—What Is the
Highest & Best Use?, REAL ESTATE & VALUATION ISSUES (May 3, 2009), https://realestatevalu-
ation.wordpress.com/2009/05/03/part-one-what-is-the-highest-best-use/ (quoting Highest
and Best Use, DICTIONARY OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISAL 135 (Appraisal Inst. ed., 4th ed. 2002)).
Such appraisals are complicated by the fact that much land is held for long periods of time
and infrequently sold. See, e.g., Joe Anuta, So Many Manhattan Apartments, So Few for Sale,
CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. (May 10, 2015), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20150510/
REAL_ESTATE/150509843/so-many-manhattan-apartments-so-few-for-sale (reporting low
number of Manhattan apartments for sale in the first quarter of 2015).
In a document discussing “common errors . . . in appraisal and review reports,” the
Appraisal Institute, the trade association for real estate appraisers, states that “[h]ighest
and best use is commonly one of the weakest areas in an appraisal.” APPRAISAL INST., COM-
MON ERRORS AND ISSUES 3, 11 (Apr. 15, 2014), http://www.appraisalinstitute.org/assets/1/
29/common-errors-issues_4-14-15.pdf; see also About Us, APPRAISAL INST., http://www
.appraisalinstitute.org/about/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2017).  Real estate appraisers fre-
quently disagree on the highest and best use of land. See MacCrate, supra (“Very often two
real estate appraisers may conclude to a different highest and best use which results in a
wide range in values and makes it difficult for judges and mediators to arrive at an accurate
estimate of value.”).
113 Such an inquiry would require finding a way to persuade individuals to honestly
state their valuations of land, a task that has preoccupied the proponents of self-assessment
mechanisms.  Posner & Weyl define allocative efficiency in terms of individual subjective
preferences. See Posner & Weyl, supra note 1, at 62 (“[A]llocative efficiency” exists if the
good is transferred from the buyer to the seller if “the buyer values the good more than the
seller”).
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hoods, replacing them with large impersonal buildings.114  There is no
guarantee that today’s judgment that certain land uses are less productive
than others will not be overturned within a few short years.
Aside from the difficulties inherent in determining whether land is effi-
ciently allocated, another reason to doubt whether land is inefficiently allo-
cated on a vast scale is that there are ways that private actors, and to some
degree governments, can, and do, overcome the veto power of the fee simple
owner.  These include eminent domain,115 deploying buying agents to
assemble land “discreetly,”116 building around holdouts,117 and zoning.118
114 See, e.g., Steven Cord, Urban Renewal: Boon or Boondoggle?, 33(2) AM. J. ECON. & SOC.
184 (1974); see also Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 521–22 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); Brief for Jane Jacobs as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 6–8, Kelo, 545
U.S. 469 (No. 04-108). See generally WENDELL E. PRITCHETT, ROBERT CLIFTON WEAVER AND
THE AMERICAN CITY: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF AN URBAN REFORMER (2008).  Thank you to
David Reiss for the reference to Pritchett’s book.
115 Fennell and Posner & Weyl refer to eminent domain as a tool of overcoming the
landowner’s veto power, but they doubt that it is of much practical utility in ensuring the
efficient allocation of land.  This is clearest in the case of Fennell, who acknowledges that
there are few legal limitations on the use of eminent domain under federal constitutional
law, but stresses that “[p]olitical limits on the use of eminent domain may be much tighter
than legal restrictions, however, often rendering this course of action unduly costly or
unavailable.”  Fennell, supra note 1, at 1483; see also id. at 1462, 1479, 1512 n.219.  Posner &
Weyl also recognize that there are few federal constitutional limits on the use of eminent
domain in light of Kelo, but they emphasize that the need to value land when exercising
eminent domain creates the potential for misallocations if land is under or overvalued. See
Posner & Weyl, supra note 1, at 106, 108–09.
Fennell and Posner & Weyl may be underestimating the extent to which eminent
domain is a viable—if costly—option for repurposing land for more productive uses in
areas where redevelopment would bring the largest gains, such as dense urban areas like
New York City. See, e.g., Christopher Serkin, Local Property Law: Adjusting the Scale of Property
Protection, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 883, 897 (2007); Christopher Serkin, Response: Testing the
Value of Eminent Domain, 89 TUL. L. REV. 115, 119 (2014); Diop et al., supra note 90, at
9–10.  Eminent domain has been used in many important redevelopment projects in New
York City’s history.  Brief for the City of New York, supra note 89, at 1–2, 14–18; Serkin,
Local Property Law, supra, at 897; Serkin, Response, supra, at 119.  New York state constitu-
tional law continues to define “public use” more expansively than other states’ state consti-
tutional law.  Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010); Goldstein v.
N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009); MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 10,
at 1193; SOMIN, supra note 50, at 187–91, 202 (discussing Kaur and Goldstein); see also id. at
196–200 (discussing Second Circuit decisions in Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir.
2008) and Didden v. Vill. of Port Chester, 173 F. App’x 931 (2d Cir. 2006)).
A working paper by Diop et al. finds that eminent domain is used more in U.S. states
with more urban land and densely populated areas than in “suburban and rural land[s]”
and less densely populated areas.  Diop et al., supra note 90, at 15, 26.
116 See Kelly, supra note 50, at 47.  For example, the Pennsylvania Railroad assembled
the land on which it built the legendary Pennsylvania Railroad Station in New York City
entirely through private, unsubsidized purchases using secret buyers who did not know the
identity of the purchaser. See The Rise and Fall of Penn Station, PBS AM. EXPERIENCE (Feb.
18, 2014), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/films/penn/.  Building the
station required tearing down 500 buildings and displacing hundreds of families.
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Another famous example of a private acquisition using secret purchase is Disney’s
acquisition of land for Disneyworld. See Kelly, supra note 50, at 22–23; see also Chad D.
Emerson, Merging Public and Private Governance: How Disney’s Reedy Creek Improvement District
“Re-Imagined” the Traditional Division of Local Regulatory Powers, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 177
(2009).  This involved the purchase of “exurban lands,” however, not urban land of the
sort that Fennell correctly argues now needs to be assembled from private buyers to facili-
tate redevelopment in cities. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON ET AL., LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES
AND MATERIALS 934 (4th ed. 2013).
Fennell mentions the potential that “private parties can attempt to amass large assem-
blages of land on their own, using buying agents and the like to get around holdout
problems.”  Fennell, supra note 1, at 1507 (citing Kelly, supra note 50, at 18–24).  But she is R
skeptical of the desirability of this approach, and observes that “even when this strategy is
successful, it concentrates ownership in a way that can generate normative concerns.” Id.
Arguably, Fennell’s approach of callable fees also could lead to concentrated ownership of
land in the hands of developers who would own “callblocks” of a sufficient size to facilitate
repurposing of land over time.
Academic scholarship tends to suggest that governments have greater difficulty than
private actors in purchasing land discreetly because of public law transparency require-
ments. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 82
(1986).  But governments may have greater scope to do so than the literature implies.
117 See ALPERN & DURST, supra note 49.
118 The plans for the redevelopment of the Hudson Yards area on Manhattan’s west
side include a park between 10th and 11th Avenues, and 34th and 39th Streets.  The City
has taken some of the land for the park by eminent domain. In re City of New York, 938
N.Y.S.2d 225 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011).  But the City aims to induce the transformation of other
parcels into parkland by granting landowners transferable development rights, pursuant to
provisions in the City zoning resolution.  NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION art. IX, ch.
3, §§ 93-32, 93-35 (2017).  This use of the City’s zoning authority to spur the creation of a
park through transferable development rights is similar to the use of transferable develop-
ment rights to offset the costs of historic preservation discussed in Penn Central, and subject
to similar criticisms that the City is evading the requirement to pay just compensation
through creative use of its zoning authority and transferable development rights.  On the
other hand, the transferable development rights may prove to be very lucrative for the
landowners, and overcompensate them for their losses.  The public will arguably benefit
from those rights though as they are funding the park.
Another option that local governments have to facilitate redevelopment is to own and
lease land, rather than to sell it outright.  By continuing to own land, local governments
retain the ability to repurpose the land to deal with local needs in the future once the lease
comes to its natural end, or in the midst of the lease if the lessee fails to satisfy one or more
conditions of the lease.  As an example, New York City Comptroller Scott Stringer recently
recommended that the City make greater use of the land that it owns for affordable hous-
ing by transferring City-owned land to a land bank for affordable housing.  The land bank
would lease the land rather than selling the land outright.  Mireya Navarro, Audit Faults
New York City for Not Using Vacant Lots for Affordable Housing, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/18/nyregion/audit-proposes-using-vacant-lots-owned-
by-new-york-city-for-affordable-housing.html.  For an example where the City is selling land
to facilitate the construction of affordable housing, see Carolina Pichardo, Inwood Library
To Be Sold to Developer for Affordable Housing, City Says, DNAINFO (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www
.dnainfo.com/new-york/20170106/inwood/inwood-library-be-sold-developer-for-afforda-
ble-housing-city-says.
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To the extent these mitigation strategies are successful, they reduce the inef-
ficiencies stemming from the fee simple owner’s veto power.
In addition to assuming that land currently is massively misallocated, a
second assumption embedded in the Chicago critique is that the misalloca-
tion is due to the veto power of the fee simple owner.  However, as discussed
above, there is an extensive body of scholarship pointing to restrictive land
use regulations as another potential cause for the misallocation, at least in
high-priced coastal cities.119
To be sure, the hypothesis that public land use regulation is the major
cause of the misallocation of land to lower value uses might be reconciled
with the hypothesis that the fee simple contributes to the misallocation of
land.  As discussed in Section II.C, the prevalence of fee simple ownership
may contribute to the stringency of land use regulations in dynamic cities.
Land owned in fee simple is likely more valuable than leased land, and the
resulting higher prices of homes built on fee simple lands may induce home-
owners to vote or participate in the land use regulatory process to protect
their valuable investment.  So, the legal structure of land ownership may be
an underlying reason why homeowners support the restrictive land use regu-
lations that economists tend to pinpoint as driving up housing costs in
dynamic urban areas.
On the other hand, it is also possible that causality runs the other way
and that land use regulations exacerbate the veto power of the fee simple.  By
restraining the supply of land for residential development, land use regula-
tions such as zoning and historic preservation laws may increase the leverage
of fee simple owners to demand higher prices or block development outright
in areas where residential development is allowed.  Thus, it may be that land
use regulation empowers fee simple owners, by reducing the amount of sub-
stitute land available for development.120  Before dispensing with the fee sim-
ple on the grounds that it leads to the misallocation of land, empirical
analysis is necessary to tease out not only whether land currently is massively
misused, but also whether any such inefficiency is due to the fee simple, pub-
lic land regulation, or other factors.
The third assumption embedded in the Chicago critique is that the crit-
ics’ proposals for reforming land ownership would be beneficial from a socie-
119 See supra notes 12 and 96.
120 For example, in the twentieth century, New York City zoning regulations incen-
tivized developers to build on large lots.  This is thought to have enhanced the power of
holdouts by requiring developers to assemble larger parcels.
Holdouts attained much of their power as a by-product of central-business-district
zoning regulations that favored, and occasionally required, large-lot develop-
ment.  Building coverage of the land typically was restricted to 25 or 40 percent of
the lot, with a 20 percent bonus in total floor area in the building in exchange for
a publicly accessible plaza on the uncovered portion of the site.  The larger the
lot, the larger the tower.  Small, strategically located holdout lots gained much
leverage in the zoning-induced hunt for large midtown lots eligible for maximum
development.
Norman Marcus, Foreword to the Second Edition, in ALPERN & DURST, supra note 49, at x.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-1\NDL101.txt unknown Seq: 31 15-NOV-17 13:44
2017] in  defense  of  the  fee  s imple 31
tal perspective, because land would be allocated more efficiently.  Posner &
Weyl concede that the workability of their proposal requires additional
evidence.121
One reason for doubting that the critics’ proposals will measurably
increase allocative efficiency is that they would retain a significant role for
government in allocating land among competing uses.  Although land use
regulation has its virtues, government policymakers face difficulties acquiring
knowledge about the best uses of land, and there is always the potential for
politics to distort land use decisionmaking.122
Posner & Weyl present their proposals as market solutions to the bar-
gaining problems created by the fee simple,123 but the government would
play a significant role in allocating land in their scheme.  It would just do so
indirectly through tax policy, rather than through conventional forms of
land use regulation such as zoning, historic preservation, and eminent
domain.  Posner & Weyl envisage that owners will value all their assets, and
pay a tax based on their valuations and transfer their assets to buyers willing
to pay their valuations.  The tax rates will influence how much people value
their assets, as owners will value their assets knowing that they will pay a tax
based on these rates and their self-assessed valuations.  In turn, individual
valuations, made in the shadow of the tax rates, will determine how assets are
allocated, because owners will have to transfer their assets to any buyer will-
ing to pay the self-assessed valuation.  If government sets the tax rate subop-
timally low, owners may inflate the value of their land, which may frustrate
valuable land assembly.  Conversely if the rate is suboptimally high, it may
depress owner valuations and enable suboptimally high levels of assembly.
Posner & Weyl assume that governments will delegate the task of setting
the tax rates to something like a fully informed intelligent algorithm that will
determine the economically optimal tax rate based on the optimal degree of
turnover and the need for investment, and will be impervious to the influ-
121 “[W]e acknowledge . . . that only empirical evidence can resolve questions about
whether our system would work well or poorly.”  Posner & Weyl, supra note 1, at 60. R
Fennell does not attempt to quantify the benefits of her proposals for callable and
floating fees, but then again there is less of a reason for her to do so given that she mod-
estly proposes supplementing the fee simple with additional forms of ownership rather
than abandoning it. See Fennell, supra note 1, at 1462, 1465, 1482–86, 1490–91. R
For discussion of the evidence that Posner & Weyl and Fennell provide, see supra note
109.
122 For a recent analysis of the politics of urban land use regulation, see Vicki Been et
al., Urban Land-Use Regulation: Are Homevoters Overtaking the Growth Machine?, 11 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 227 (2014).
123 Thus they write that:
[O]ur system is far from centralized planning.  The government does not set prices,
allocate resources, or assign people jobs: it plays no role, except to mechanically
administer a system of property rights.  Indeed . . . the government’s role would be
more limited than it is today because there is no need for discretionary interventions to solve
holdout and other monopoly-related problems . . . .
Posner & Weyl, supra note 1, at 69–70 (emphasis added); see also id. at 66 n.20.
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ence of policymakers and interest groups, like developers and landowners.124
But it is unrealistic to think that policymakers will delegate the determination
of tax rates to an algorithm in the country of “no taxation without representa-
tion”—especially when those tax rates are likely to significantly impact the
value of the homes that are the most valuable asset that many people own.125
Rather, the tax rates likely would be established in the shadow of the same
information problems and interest group politics that beset land use regula-
tion and eminent domain today.
Fennell is more explicit than Posner & Weyl about the role that govern-
ment will play with callable and floating fees.126  The government likely will
be determining the boundaries of the callblock and floating fee districts.127
Drawing these boundaries presumably will resemble the current zoning pro-
cess, although the stated goal will differ, because in establishing callable and
floating fees, governments will be concerned with designating areas of a suffi-
cient size to facilitate redevelopment in the future, once land use needs
change.  Just as information constraints and interest groups influence con-
ventional zoning, they are similarly likely to affect the drawing of callable and
floating fee district boundaries.  Local governments likely will err in the
direction of over- and underinclusion, because quite apart from the potential
for politics to influence the line drawing exercise, it will be difficult to predict
ex ante what size of parcel will be optimal for uses that are unknown at the
time of mapping.128
124 See, e.g., id. at 75 (referring to “the cadaster . . . choos[ing] a whole panoply of tax
rates”).  Of the cadaster, Posner & Weyl explain:
Of course a cadaster is inanimate and in many implementations it would be
cadastral authorities that would implement the system.  However, we choose to
view the cadaster itself as an agent because, as we discuss below, our system does
not require any discretionary authority and could be implemented using, for
example, an algorithm or a distributed/decentralized blockchain to avoid the
possibility of the system being abused.  As such we prefer to think of the system as
either being itself the enforcement agent or as an impersonal agent of the
broader community rather than vesting any power in central authorities who
might abuse or manipulate it, given that our goal is precisely to circumvent the
reliance of past systems on arbitrary centralized judicial discretion.
Id. at 66–67 n.20.
While Posner & Weyl envisage the tax rates being set in a mechanistic fashion, they
seem to envisage actual people, subject to political influences, classifying assets into differ-
ent categories that will be subject to different tax rates. See id. at 74–75.
125 On the significance of the home as an investment, see FISCHEL, supra note 105.
126 See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 1, at 1484–85.
127 Id. at 1484–85, 1498.  Although Fennell mentions that landowners themselves might
establish the boundaries for callable or floating fee districts, she concedes that this is likely
to be difficult, partly because of transaction costs involved in getting the landowners
together, especially in areas where there are many existing landowners. Id. at 1498, 1506.
128 Moreover, the costs of correcting this over- or underinclusion might be high, at least
in the case of callable fee districts.  Fennell would require that the owner of the call option
buy back all the parcels within the callblock. Id. at 1485.  So if the land required for a
development in fifty years required some of the parcels located in each of five callblocks,
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In sum, there are reasons to assume that the inefficient allocations of
land will persist if we make reasonable assumptions about how the Chicago
proposals likely would be implemented.  Moreover, it is far from clear that
land currently is misallocated on the grand scale that the Chicago critics sup-
pose, or that this serious misallocation, if it exists, is due primarily to the fee
simple, as opposed to other factors such as the public land use regulation
that has been the object of much recent criticism from economists.
B. The Economic Benefits of the Fee Simple
Even though the fee simple allows owners to block efficient land trans-
fers to higher value uses, it is by no means evident that the fee simple is an
inefficient form of landownership, because it also has important benefits to
offset its downsides.  Below I identify four economic benefits of perpetual
land rights that need to be kept in mind in considering the Chicago critique.
These benefits underscore that the critique highlights only one potential
consequence of the fee simple.
One standard economic argument for perpetual land rights is that they
incentivize property owners to invest in land to maximize its value over time.
The fee simple owner knows that they will reap the benefits of improving the
land or refraining from extracting its resources.129  On the other hand, own-
ers of legal interests with a shorter duration, like a lease, will focus on maxi-
mizing the value of the land only for the period for which they hold it.130
Thus, they may not make expensive investments in maintaining the land,
because they will not reap the benefits of these investments.  Robert, the
lessee of the Greenwich Village townhouse, is unlikely to install a new roof, or
replace the boiler, because he would pay the cost of the investment but reap
only a share of the benefits, absent some mechanism for allocating these
costs between him and the fee simple landowner.131
the developer nonetheless would have to purchase all the parcels within the five callblocks,
and would presumably persuade the government to redraw the boundaries of the callblock
districts to create the space for the redevelopment and deal with the remaining callblock
parcels.
129 See Ellickson, The Costs of Complex Land Titles, supra note 19, at 297; Ellickson, Prop-
erty in Land, supra note 19, at 1368; Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual
Property? A Classical Liberal Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 STAN. L REV. 455, 482 (2010).
130 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 73–74 (7th ed. 2007) (“A life
tenant will have an incentive to maximize not the value of the property—that is, the pre-
sent value of the entire stream of future earnings obtainable from it—but only the present
value of the earnings stream obtainable during his expected lifetime.  He will therefore
want to cut timber before it has attained its mature growth even though the present value
of the timber would be greater if the cutting of some or all of it were postponed, if the
added value from waiting would inure to the remainderman.”); see also Caterina, supra
note 23, at 7–8.
131 See Posner & Weyl, supra note 1, at 64 (stating that tenant will not paint the apart-
ment because “she incurs the full cost of the painting . . . but not all the benefit of those
investments”). But see Ellickson, The Costs of Complex Land Titles, supra note 19, at 285
(arguing that tenant will make optimal repair under certain conditions, in particular
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To be sure, the fact that the legal interest is perpetual does not mean
that any individual owner’s time horizon will be endless.  People often dis-
count the future, and focus on near-term costs and benefits instead.132  Indi-
viduals also may make suboptimal choices because they lack the information
necessary to maximize the value of land over the long term even if they are so
inclined.  However, the endless duration of the fee simple should encourage
owners to think longer term than an interest of shorter and limited duration,
as it provides a mechanism for owners to internalize the benefits and costs of
their decisions over the long haul.
The Chicago critics recognize that the fee simple promotes invest-
ment.133  To their credit, Posner & Weyl acknowledge that eliminating the
right of owners to block transfers will reduce the incentive to invest in their
assets; Posner & Weyl’s argument is that the resulting increase in allocative
efficiency will offset the decline in investment incentives.134  But they may be
undervaluing the magnitude of the decline in the incentive to invest in the
asset—the land, in the case of the fee simple—that would follow from elimi-
nating perpetual ownership.
Moreover, in focusing on the effect of eliminating perpetual ownership
on the incentive to invest in the owned asset, the Chicago critics likely are
taking an unduly narrow view of the objects that would suffer a decline in
investment.  They seem to ignore the likelihood that individuals living in a
society where they can be forced to transfer their assets at any time may be
much less inclined to invest in other things as well, such as place-based goods
that generate social capital.  If I can be made to transfer my house any time a
buyer is willing to pay my valuation, why should I invest in developing a com-
munity of friends for my children, let alone myself?  Why should I spend time
building the parent-teacher association at the neighborhood school, building
a community association, or cleaning up the nearby public park (assuming
there still would be public parks in Posner & Weyl’s world)?135  The conse-
quences of making everyone vulnerable to losing their land, as well as other
“when there are only two temporally defined interests, both are easy to value, and both are
owned by individuals who trust one another”).
132 See Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 853–56 (2009).
133 See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 1, at 1466, 1468–69, 1480; Posner & Weyl, supra note 1,
at 51–54, 61, 63–64 (referring to private property generally, not the fee simple specifically,
as promoting investment).
134 Posner & Weyl, supra note 1, at 68, 114.  The reason that the increased benefits in R
allocative efficiency are not completely offset by the decline in the incentives to invest is
that enabling transfers will facilitate the sales with the highest upside. See id. at 68 (“[T]he
most valuable sales are ones where the buyer is willing to pay significantly more than the
seller is willing to accept.  These transactions are the first ones enabled by a reduction in
the price.”).  But I wonder if Posner & Weyl’s proposal is necessary to facilitate transfers
that have a high upside.  Presumably these transfers stand a good chance of occurring
anyways, because there is a large surplus available for the buyer to share with the seller.
135 See id. at 97–98 (discussing the application of their proposal to “publicly owned
resources”).
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assets, could extend well beyond a reduction in the incentive to invest in land
and houses.
Fennell’s proposals are less likely to reduce the incentive to invest in
land, and other goods that generate social capital.  Her callable and floating
fees would apply only to land, and she would not comprehensively replace
the fee simple with these callable and floating fees.  She envisages individuals
self-selecting to buy into callable and floating fee districts whose boundaries
are drawn by local governments, and so the individuals who buy in might be
risk-neutral or risk-preferring, leaving risk-averse buyers to purchase fee sim-
ples.136  Still, there would be some reduced incentive to invest in land—and
potentially social capital—under floating and callable fees because the
probability that one’s ownership would come to an end would be greater
than under a fee simple.  In addition, that probability could be influenced by
factors over which individual owners have little control.137
A second economic argument in favor of the fee simple is that the sim-
plicity of a perpetual term makes it easier to alienate land, and therefore to
transfer it to its highest and best use.138  Property interests generally are
transferable, regardless of whether they are endless like the fee simple, or
limited like leases.139  But the fee simple is especially marketable because
there is minimal uncertainty about the duration of the interest in most cases,
since there is little risk that it will end from an owner dying heirless.  The
knowledge that the legal interest can last forever makes it easier for buyers to
value the interest, and for lenders to lend against it, because they need not
worry about future interest holders seizing the asset.140  By way of contrast,
136 See Fennell, supra note 1, at 1488. R
137 For example, Fennell mentions that the developer holding a call option might be
able to buy back the parcels within the callblock if there were “significant population
changes that are not matched by commensurate densification (or de-densification) within
the callblock” or “underperformance of the callblock as a whole on pre-established metrics
(property value declines, residential density shortfalls, housing affordability, and so on),
relative to the surrounding region.” Id. at 1484–85.  Fennell suggests that making land-
owners vulnerable to losing their land if the area fails to meet specified performance
targets might encourage landowners to work together to satisfy the targets. Id. at 1487.
But it is unlikely to be easy for neighbors to manage their land use to meet the kinds of
targets that Fennell mentions, especially if there are numerous neighbors and the targets
relate to matters that even the neighbors collectively cannot control, such as population
changes within the callblock district or the local jurisdiction in which it resides.  As a result,
the potential of losing their land to the developer for the failure to satisfy a performance
target might just as easily disincentivize landowners from investing in their land—and con-
sequently social capital—as incentivize investment in collective decision-making with
neighbors. See also Ellickson, The Costs of Complex Land Titles, supra note 19, at 298 (arguing
that the practice in Chinese villages of “reshuffl[ing] . . . the pairings between households
and fields” undermines the incentive to take care of the fields).
138 See generally Ellickson, The Costs of Complex Land Titles, supra note 19, at 290–91,
300–02 (emphasizing the benefits “of a simple system of perpetual private land rights”).
139 See Stoebuck & Whitman, supra note 18, §§ 6.67–.71, at 379–87.
140 Ellickson, Property in Land, supra note 19, at 1368 n.267 (“With a fee (or long-term
lease) as security, a lender need not take steps to guard against a borrower’s death or
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consider a life estate, a legal interest in land for the life of some person.  A
life estate ends when the measuring life does, but no one knows with precise
certainty when that date will come.  While technically saleable, there is little
market for this type of legal interest because it, unlike the fee simple, is of
limited and uncertain duration.141  Under Posner & Weyl’s proposal and
Fennell’s callblocks and floating fees, land rights would be for an uncertain
duration.  Posner & Weyl briefly consider some of the implications of their
proposal for financing asset purchases.142  But they do not grapple in any
depth with how creditors would value assets under their proposal, which
would lead to more frequent turnover of assets.
A third economic argument for the fee simple is that it economizes on
information costs.143  When land is privately owned outright, there is no
need for a central government authority to be involved in reallocating land,
through setting tax rates, or designating areas for callblocks and floating
fees—or directly reallocating land ownership periodically if it reverts to the
government at the end of a lease-like arrangement.  Because there is no need
for the government to involve itself in allocating land, no central authority
has to acquire detailed information about the character of the land and opti-
mal land uses in order to determine who should manage it.  Decisionmaking
is decentralized along with land ownership to individuals who are closer to
the land than a central authority would be, and able to use their understand-
ing of the land to more cheaply determine how the land should be used.
A fourth possible benefit of fee simple ownership is that it may lower the
cost of enforcing property rights by inducing bottom-up compliance with
them.  I advance this hypothesis tentatively, because it warrants more analysis
flight.  These risks daunt secured lenders when a borrower’s land interest is merely a life
estate or a usufruct.”).
141 Epstein explains that “the uncertainty in the duration of the term creates genuine
ambiguities” for “alienation.”  Epstein, supra note 129, at 482.  Similarly, “[p]roperty tied
up with contingent future interests [such as defeasible fees] is often difficult to sell, mort-
gage, or manage.”  Jerry L. Anderson, The Divergent Evolution of English Property Law, 29
PROB. & PROP. 50, 52 (2015).
Another example of the effects of limited duration on the marketability of legal inter-
ests in land concerns the marketability of condominium and cooperative buildings in New
York City built on leased land.  The apartments in these buildings generally are cheaper
and harder to sell than the apartments in buildings built on land owned by the building in
fee simple.  In addition, as the end of the building’s lease with the landowner approaches,
buyers face difficulties obtaining financing to buy apartments. See generally Satow, supra
note 28.
142 Posner & Weyl, supra note 1, at 83–85.  Posner & Weyl suggest that their proposal R
would reduce the need for financing to buy assets, because their proposal would lower
asset values. Id. at 85, 87–88.
143 This paragraph applies to the fee simple one of Merrill and Smith’s information
cost arguments for the right to exclude as the core of property. See MERRILL & SMITH,
supra note 10, at 31; Merrill, supra note 48, at 2081–83; Smith, supra note 82, at 1704.  The
fee simple might be regarded as the best example of the kind of private property right that
Merrill and Smith defend, because it is the most robust form of private property due to its
perpetual duration.
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than I can offer here.  The intuition is that allocating perpetual rights to land
sets up a situation that resembles an indefinitely repeated game; fee simple
owners have land rights that will last forever (barring the low probability
event that they will pass away heirless).144  Game theory suggests that the
expectation of repeat play with no fixed endpoint may induce cooperation,
although theory emphasizes that noncooperation also is a possible out-
come.145  Thinking optimistically, fee simple owners may be well-placed to
engage in a tit-for-tat strategy that induces cooperation.146  Neighboring fee
simple owners potentially are well-positioned to observe and retaliate against
boundary violations.  Landowners also may be motivated to stand on their
rights, because the rights’ endless time horizon means that the landowners
will reap the rewards of enforcement.  Widely disseminating fee simple own-
ership may address the potential problem that nonowners might not have
much to lose by infringing property rights; if many people are fee simple
owners, many may have an incentive to respect the land rights of others to
avoid theirs being infringed.  So, a less heralded benefit of perpetual land
rights is that they may lower the cost of enforcing property rights, by induc-
ing a norm within society of complying with land rights, especially if there are
few nonowners.  This norm might dissipate if property changes hands more
often, as likely would occur under Posner & Weyl’s proposal.  With greater
turnover, neighbors would have fewer opportunities to observe and retaliate
against boundary violations, because they would not get to know each other,
or their land or buildings, as well as neighbors do with perpetual land
rights.147
In sum, while the Chicago critique emphasizes the downsides of the fee
simple, this form of ownership also has significant upsides.  It facilitates
investment (a point that the critics acknowledge).  Its simplicity likely facili-
tates alienation by comparison with more uncertain legal interests, especially
if buyers require financing.  It also avoids the need for a central governmen-
tal authority to acquire information to manage land because the fee simple
decentralizes decision-making authority.  Moreover, the fee simple may lower
the cost of enforcing property rights by facilitating the bottom-up develop-
144 As indicated above (supra note 15), this hypothesis was suggested to me by Richard R
Revesz.
145 See, e.g., DOUGLAS C. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 165–78 (1994); ROB-
ERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 164–66 (1991); Pedro Dal Bó & Guillaume R.
Fréchette, The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence, 101
AM. ECON. REV. 411, 411–13 (2011); Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic Spillovers, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
1641, 1713 & n.350 (2011).
146 On tit-for-tat, see ELLICKSON, supra note 145, at 164–65.
147 Fennell suggests that callable and floating fees might induce owners whose property
rights could be called or moved to a different location to cooperate with each other to
protect their communities.  Fennell, supra note 1, at 1487, 1502–03.  Cooperation could
include respecting each other’s property rights.  But it is also possible that such fees might
induce neighbors to free ride on each other, and therefore lead them to collectively under-
mine their property entitlements.
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ment of a norm of complying with land rights.  We should not overlook these
various benefits, even as we recognize the costs of the fee simple.
IV. THE FREEDOM-ENHANCING DIMENSION OF THE FEE SIMPLE
The Chicago critique is an economic critique of the fee simple and thus
far I have considered the critics’ arguments and their proposals on their own,
economic terms.  I now want to think about the costs of the critics’ proposals
through a noneconomic lens.  The conventional economic discussion of the
fee simple in terms of its impacts on investment and allocation does not fully
encapsulate the benefits of the fee simple.  The fee simple also is valuable
because it gives landowners a right to choose, free from the influence of
others, whether to transfer their land in perpetuity (subject to whatever limi-
tations are imposed by public and private land use regulation).  Because the
fee simple landowner has the right to decide whether to transfer their land,
they also have the right to decide not to transfer it—and to gift it, to share it,
to preserve it, to mine it, or do other things with it instead (subject once
again to regulatory constraints).  The Chicago critics’ proposals would fur-
ther diminish the choice sets of landowners beyond what public and private
land use regulation already do, by casting aside the landowner’s right to
decide whether to retain their land.  There are often important reasons for
the restrictions that public and private land use regulation impose on the
landowner’s right to decide whether to sell their land or keep it, and to do
other things; nothing I say here is meant to call into question the edifice of
land use regulation constructed over the past few centuries.  The Chicago
critics’ proposals would go further down the path of diminishing the choice
sets of landowners, and, in my view, would be one step too far if implemented
comprehensively.
The interference with individual choice sets would be most extreme
under Posner & Weyl’s proposal.  They would force landowners to put a
value on their land that would be publicly available, and to transfer the land
to anyone who came along willing to pay that price.  The landowner would
not have the choice to keep the property off the market,148 or to gift, share,
or preserve the property in perpetuity in the way that the authority to decide
whether to retain the land makes possible.  Fennell’s proposal does not cut
back as much on the right to choose, because Fennell envisages that callblock
and floating fees would coexist with fee simples, and landowners would have
the option to buy fee simples outside the callblock and floating fee districts.
But her proposal still constrains choice, because it would limit the land avail-
148 However, Posner & Weyl would
allow owners to declare intervals up to some reasonable limit (say a year or two)
during which they wish to maintain ownership.  Upon declaring such an interval,
the individual would have to declare a value and allow potential purchasers a ‘last
chance’ to claim the good before such an interval began.
Posner & Weyl, supra note 1, at 89.  They also suggest that “current owners” could have “a R
few months” to move from “real property” that someone had acquired from them. Id.
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able in fee simple.  A purchaser who wants to live in a specific area would be
forced into callblocks and floating fees if all of the places where the pur-
chaser wants to be are designated for such fees.149  For analytical conve-
nience, I will focus on illustrating the costs of Posner & Weyl’s proposal, since
it would represent the starkest elimination of the fee simple.
A. The Importance of the Right to Decide Whether to Transfer
Why is the right to choose whether to transfer your land so important?
Or conversely, what are the costs of requiring the landowner to put a price
on their land, and forcing them to sell their land if someone else comes
along and wants to buy it, or if certain triggers are met as under Fennell’s
proposal?150
One reason why the right to be able to decide whether to transfer your
land is important is that it protects individuals against being subject to the
whims of others, or, in Philip Pettit’s terms, dominated by others.151  The
battered wife is dominated by her violent husband, because if she complains
he may beat her depending on his mood;152 the impoverished tenant has to
live with their moody landlord’s decision not to turn up the heat or fix the
toilet because they lack the resources to assert the right to a habitable apart-
ment or to move.153  Under Posner & Weyl’s proposal, individual landowners
would be vulnerable to anyone coming along at any time, and forcing them
to sell their land for any reason.154  The only consolation is that the buyer
would have to pay the transferor their self-assessed value of the land.
Now Posner & Weyl might argue that their proposal does not increase
the extent to which landowners are vulnerable to the whims of others com-
pared to the status quo.  For example, they might say that if their proposal
were implemented, it presumably would be through a democratically elected
149 Fennell, supra note 1, at 1511 (“While the opportunity to opt into different tenure
forms does make a normative difference . . . it does not provide a complete answer to
concerns about displacement.”).
150 Thank you to Jeremy Waldron for suggesting several different ways of understand-
ing the importance of the perpetual right to decide whether to sell your land, including
Philip Pettit’s analysis of nondomination.
151 PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT (1997).  Pet-
tit defines a person as dominated—and hence not free—when someone else (1) has “the
capacity to interfere” (2) “on an arbitrary basis” (3) “in certain choices that” the person “is
in a position to make.” Id. at 52.  Pettit argues that a person’s choices are vulnerable to
being arbitrarily interfered with when another has the ability to act to worsen the person’s
situation, based on the other’s interests and desires, without considering the person’s.  For
Pettit’s understanding of arbitrariness and nonarbitrariness, see id. at 55–56.
152 Id. at 5.
153 For an evocative account of the constrained choices of low-income people in the
private rental market, see MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERI-
CAN CITY (2016).
154 As noted above, Posner & Weyl would allow owners to keep land (and other prop-
erty types) off the market only temporarily, and only after giving buyers “a ‘last chance’ to
claim the good before such an interval began.”  Posner & Weyl, supra note 1, at 89.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-1\NDL101.txt unknown Seq: 40 15-NOV-17 13:44
40 notre dame law review [vol. 93:1
legislature overhauling fee simple landownership, after holding hearings at
which landowners could testify, because novel forms of property rights are
usually implemented by legislatures, rather than courts.155  But the demo-
cratic pedigree of the transferee’s right to purchase should not obscure the
vulnerability of the individual transferor to losing their land for any reason.
We must look through the origins of the rule and examine whether its imple-
mentation in individual decisions takes into account the interests of the
transferor (as well as the transferee).156
A second argument that Posner & Weyl might make is that individual
transfers under their proposed form of ownership would take into account
the interests of the transferor because, as just mentioned, the transferee
would have to pay the transferor a price set by the transferor through the self-
assessment method.  But it is not clear that the price set by the transferor
should be regarded as a genuine reflection of the transferor’s interests in the
land.  Every owner will be valuing their land—and other forms of property—
in the shadow of the taxes that the government will establish to encourage
the optimal turnover rate of goods.  Taxes will be integral to keeping the
landowner from using their valuation strategically to frustrate land assembly
or extract higher prices from assemblers.157  But the taxes also may distort
the owner’s valuation if the owner lacks “the liquidity” to pay much in the way
of taxes.158  Moreover, the price that owners put on their land and other
objects may not be personalized to them.  Recognizing that most individuals
do not walk around with valuations of their property, Posner & Weyl envisage
owners using “default valuations” automatically provided “using collaborative
filtering and other techniques that form the basis of . . . ubiquitous recom-
mendation engines.”159  This suggests that so-called self-assessed valuations
will reflect an aggregation of others’ valuations, influenced by the tax
155 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Prop-
erty: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000) (arguing that legislatures do,
and should, introduce novel property rights).  Fennell contemplates that state legislation
might allow callable and floating fees to be established in specific areas if “a supermajority”
favors shifting to one of these fees.  Fennell, supra note 1, at 1498.  So Fennell would have
not only legislators, but also landowners, deciding whether to alter property rights. See id.
156 Pettit emphasizes that the test for whether an act is an arbitrary interference is a
procedural test rather than a substantive test.
Notice that an act of interference can be arbitrary in the procedural sense
intended here—it may occur on an arbitrary basis—without being arbitrary in the
substantive sense of actually going against the interests or judgements of the per-
sons affected.  An act is arbitrary, in this usage, by virtue of the controls—specifi-
cally, the lack of controls—under which it materializes, not by virtue of the
particular consequences to which it gives rise. . . . What is in question in each case
is a power of interfering on an arbitrary, unchecked basis.
PETTIT, supra note 151, at 55.
157 Posner & Weyl, supra note 1, at 67.
158 Posner & Weyl vaguely suggest that private insurers might develop an insurance
product that “would cover the tax payments in exchange for a share of the gains if the
house were sold at the going price.”  Posner & Weyl, supra note 1, at 88.
159 Id. at 78.
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requirements, not any particular interest that the owner has in the land.160
Even if the price should be regarded as the owner’s in some real sense, the
fact that the owner would be paid for the transfer does nothing to address
the fact that the owner would have lost their ability to decide whether to sell
their property in the first place, and at what time.
Perhaps the strongest argument that Posner & Weyl might make that
their proposal would not increase the overall amount of domination in soci-
ety is that it would only alter who is dominated and who are the dominators.
Posner & Weyl might argue that landowners who currently use their fee sim-
ples to hold out and block development subject developers to their whims;
removing the holdouts’ power would allow developers to subject landowners
to their whims.161  The idea that the proposal would merely redistribute
domination and not increase it assumes that individuals would be as likely to
be assemblers in Posner & Weyl’s world as they are to be holdouts in the
current world.  If this is so, then the loss of the right to hold out will be
canceled out by the acquisition of the right to compulsorily purchase others’
land.  But if, as seems more likely, many of those who can hold out now are
poorly positioned to assemble land in Posner & Weyl’s world, then the bene-
ficiaries of the overhaul will be those who can use the power to compulsorily
acquire land.162  The “losers” will be the far more numerous among us who
lack the capital or know-how to buy land for development and will instead be
subject to the whims of assemblers, and have to transfer them land, whenever
they want it, at the price that we have set constrained by taxes intended to
discipline our valuation.  Overall, given inequalities in the distribution of cap-
ital and know-how, domination seems likely to increase if Posner & Weyl’s
proposal to substitute the right to hold out with the right to compulsory
acquisition is implemented.163
160 Id. at 77–78.
161 The above discussion sets to the side the possibility that any owner might be both a
holdout and a developer interested in assembling land.
162 Posner & Weyl seem to think it will become easier to become an owner in their
world because asset values will fall.  Posner & Weyl, supra note 1, at 85.  But this ignores the R
fact that declining asset values will reduce wealth, and presumably incomes as well.  So
those who are better off now might be less wealthy compared to the status quo, but they
presumably will remain wealthier than many others in Posner & Weyl’s world as well.
Indeed, the better off may become even better off relative to others, because the better off
may be able to shield some of their assets from the Posner & Weyl form of ownership by
taking them out of the United States and putting them in countries that retain perpetual
ownership.
163 Posner & Weyl suggest that the distributional consequences of their proposal could
be mitigated by using the funds raised from their proposed tax on asset values to fund a
universal basic income. Id. at 71, 85–86.  Whether the tax could be used to fund such a
program would depend on the amount collected, and whether there would be sufficient
political consensus to use the proceeds for a universal basic income.  I am not optimistic.
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B. Why Protect Individuals Against the Whims of Others
Establishing that Posner & Weyl’s proposal would increase the extent to
which individuals are at the mercy of others’ whims still begs the question of
why we want to avoid being subject to the whims of others.  Here we can
borrow from Pettit’s explanation of why the modern state should seek to pro-
mote nondomination to understand the costs of removing the owner’s right
to decide whether to sell their property or hold it.164
One reason is that protection from the whims of others gives individuals
some certainty that enables them to make plans and reduces their level of
“anxiety” about their lives.165  Posner & Weyl implicitly concede that their
vision of ownership would leave people more uncertain, because they
acknowledge that their proposal would reduce the incentive to invest in
property.166  But that reduction in investment incentives is only one manifes-
tation of the uncertainty produced by making everyone transfer their prop-
erty when someone wants to buy it.  When there is always the chance that one
may be forced to transfer one’s home, one may be living “under constant fear
of unpredictable interference, and” so unable to “organize” where one will
live or work, where one’s children will go to school, how to get them there
and how to feed them, with any degree of “tranquility.”167
A second reason for safeguarding individuals against the whims of others
is to save individuals the need to be constantly anticipating the behavior of
those who have more capital than them and might be interested in buying
their land, and recalibrating their behavior in light of the acts of others.  Pos-
ner & Weyl anticipate that individuals will be constantly updating their valua-
tions in light of the valuations that others are imposing on their property.168
If individuals fail to update their valuations to reflect others’, they may
become vulnerable to forcibly losing their land, or they may be paid a lower
price for it than an owner of similar land.  Posner & Weyl maintain that ongo-
ing advances in information technology will make their proposal feasible,
because they predict that technology will enable individuals to gather infor-
mation about others’ activities and update their valuations more quickly.169
But the need to constantly be on the lookout, to be monitoring what others
are doing, and to be strategically putting a price on your land (and other
property) in light of your goals and the behavior of others is itself a cost of
their proposal.  As Pettit puts it, “[y]ou can never sail on, unconcerned, in
the pursuit of your own affairs; you have to navigate an area that is mined on
164 Pettit has sought to revive “freedom as non-domination” as a “political ideal” for the
modern state. PETTIT, supra note 151, at 80–81.  Above I apply Pettit’s three arguments for
nondomination in defense of the fee simple.  For his elaboration of the arguments, see id.
at 85–90.
165 Id. at 85.
166 See Posner & Weyl, supra note 1, at 70–71.
167 PETTIT, supra note 151, at 86.
168 Posner & Weyl, supra note 1, at 102.
169 Id. at 82.
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all sides with dangers.”170  Does the busy parent who is multitasking at home
and at work want to have the added burden of putting a price on their land
and constantly monitoring their neighbors’ valuations and whether develop-
ers are interested in the area, so as to decide whether their own valuation
needs updating?171
A third reason to protect individuals from the whims of others is to avoid
individuals becoming subordinate to other individuals.172  When one’s posi-
tion can be worsened by the capricious act of another, then one is likely to
feel that one is a lesser person than that other, because one is effectively at
their mercy.  Thus, the tenant who is too poor to assert their legal right to
heat or a working toilet may feel themselves to be a lesser person than their
landlord.  Under Posner & Weyl’s proposal, every landowner is subordinate
to those with the capital to buy their land.  If all landowners had equal capi-
tal, knowledge, and ability, then they might exist in a state of equality.  But in
the real world where all three are distributed unequally, giving everyone the
right to force others from their land upon the payment of their price is
bound to reward those with greater access to capital.  Just as eminent domain
is commonly regarded as a tool susceptible to abuse by the wealthy and con-
nected to the detriment of the less well-off,173 so privatizing the power of
compulsory purchase to everyone is likely to disproportionately benefit those
with capital.  We run the risk that the less well-off will perceive themselves as
the inferiors of the wealthy because they will be subject to an even greater
extent to the whims of the rich, who can displace them from their homes and
apartments upon the payment of a price that the less well-off may have strug-
gled to find time to identify while trying to manage the daily necessities of
life.174
170 PETTIT, supra note 151, at 86.
171 Posner & Weyl indicate that valuing assets would be on par with many of the tasks
that people already do in “the market economy,” such as “[c]alculating retirement payoffs,
[and] choosing among credit instruments.”  Posner & Weyl, supra note 1, at 90.  It is not R
clear that many people perform these existing tasks well.  Their proposal would impose an
additional burden on individuals that might dwarf the existing burdens in its complexity.
172 See PETTIT, supra note 151, at 88–89.
173 Serkin, Response, supra note 115, at 121.
174 As noted above, I doubt that the distributional consequences of Posner & Weyl’s
proposal would be addressed by their suggestion that the proposed tax could fund a uni-
versal basic income. See supra note 163.
There is a brief passage in Pettit’s Republicanism that suggests that were he to have
considered the matter, Pettit himself might have regarded the elimination of the fee sim-
ple as likely to lead to more domination, contrary to his aim of promoting more freedom.
The passage describes private property as protecting individuals against being dominated
by others, and argues that eliminating private property would reduce the protection that
individuals enjoy against the whims of others.  PETTIT, supra note 151, at 89.  Pettit
obliquely acknowledges that private property might limit the scope for individual choice
and contribute to domination, because it requires state enforcement of owners’ property
rights, which harms those excluded by state authority from others’ land. Id. at 135.  (As
Posner & Weyl mention, “[n]ineteenth century critics of Adam Smith’s theories of the
market economy identified private property as one of the chief culprits in what they saw as
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Still a fourth rationale for protecting individuals from the whims of
others is to enable owners to be autonomous, in the sense of masters of their
own lives.  Autonomy, Pettit insists, is a more expansive idea than
nondomination that presupposes that one is not dominated by others.175  To
shape your own life you must be able to plan, to proceed without having to
constantly update your behavior in light of the actions of others, and to per-
ceive yourself as on an equal footing with others.  Fennell and others recog-
nize that eminent domain entails “the confiscation of autonomy,”176 because
when a government expropriates property, it removes the right of landown-
ers to decide not to sell their property.  By extension, privatizing and decen-
tralizing the right to forcibly acquire property would further undermine
autonomy.177
wasteful economic relationships, as well as systems of domination.”  Posner & Weyl, supra
note 1, at 56.)  But Pettit maintains that on balance, private property enhances individuals’ R
choices, because it “make[s] choices and courses of action accessible—for example, those
that involve owning and selling and giving things away—that would not otherwise exist
even as possibilities.” PETTIT, supra note 151, at 135.  Because the fee simple provides the
most complete bundle of rights of any property interest in land, and because it is poten-
tially perpetual, the argument that private property expands the choices available to those
with property applies most aptly to the fee simple form of private property.
175 PETTIT, supra note 151, at 81–82.
176 Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 957, 994; see
also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
184 (1985), cited by Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, supra, at 994 n.121; Lee Anne
Fennell, Just Enough, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 109, 117 (2013) (“For homeowners, the
autonomy to decide whether and when to sell has two components[:] . . . One element
relates to the consumption experience of homeownership and the value of the option to
remain in possession as long as one likes. . . . The second facet of autonomy relates to the
home as an investment and the ability to hold that investment for as long as one likes.”);
Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, supra, at 966 (“A property owner typically
possesses not just the power to turn away a would-be buyer who offers less than her reserva-
tion price, and not just the additional power to try her best to win a share of any surplus
that the would-be buyer’s proffered transfer would create, but something more.  She has
the power to turn away a buyer altogether . . . .”); Brian Angelo Lee, Just Undercompensation:
The Idiosyncratic Premium in Eminent Domain, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 593, 640 (2013).
177 One reader of this Article asked why autonomy requires perpetual landownership,
and why a life estate would not be sufficient to protect individual autonomy.  One answer is
the desire of many people to provide for their children and grandchildren.  As discussed
below, there was a debate in nineteenth century Prince Edward Island, Canada, about
whether leasehold ownership should be switched to fee simple ownership.  In analyzing the
main themes in the arguments for switching land tenure from leaseholds to fee simple
ownership, Margaret McCallum quotes one tenant representative as telling
the 1860 Land Commission that the leasehold system “may do very well for old
bachelors who never expect to be any benefit to their country . . . but . . . [it] has
sown the seeds of discontent in many families.  Young men have seen and felt the
difficulties under which their fathers have toiled . . . and our sons have become
wanderers from home, tossed hither and thither over the surface of the earth like
the thistle down in autumn.”
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C. Examples
Returning to the language of economics, the independence and auton-
omy that the fee simple facilitates is something on which people appear to
place a monetary value.  Ten years ago, Schill et al. showed that condomin-
ium apartments are generally worth more than cooperative apartments in
New York City.178  Although Schill et al. do not interpret their findings this
way, the price differential might be considered some evidence that people
are willing to pay a premium to have fee simple ownership.  Condominiums
and cooperative apartments entail different forms of ownership.  “The con-
dominium owner owns his or her unit in fee simple absolute and shares an
undivided interest in the common elements (for example, sidewalks, hall-
ways, pools, clubhouse, storage place) as a tenant in common with the other
condominium owners.  In contrast,”179 the owner of a cooperative apartment
owns shares in the cooperative corporation that owns the building and leases
their apartment from the cooperative.180  “Both condominium associations
and cooperative corporations enact rules that govern the behavior of their
residents,”181 but “the rules of” cooperative associations usually restrict own-
ers more than the rules of condominium associations.182  For example, coop-
erative associations usually insist on approving the sales of shares, often “limit
the amount of debt an owner may secure with his or her shares,”183 and
restrict subletting.  Thus, the price premium for condominiums can be
regarded as some evidence that people are willing to pay what might be
called a “control premium” to own their property outright in fee simple,
because condominium owners have fee simples and more control over their
units than owners in a cooperative.184  The theoretical protection that the
fee simple offers of independence and autonomy appears to be valued today
in the marketplace.185
Margaret E. McCallum, The Sacred Rights of Property: Title, Entitlement, and the Land Question
in Nineteenth-Century Prince Edward Island, in ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF CANADIAN LAW 358,
369 (G. Blaine Baker & Jim Phillips eds., 1999) (alterations in original).
178 See Michael H. Schill et al., The Condominium Versus Cooperative Puzzle: An Empirical
Analysis of Housing in New York City, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 275 (2007).
179 Id. at 277.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 281.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 282.
184 To be sure, there also may be other explanations for the price differential.  For
example, there is a difference in the financing arrangements between a condominium and
a cooperative which make buying a cooperative somewhat more financially risky and which
account in part for the more intrusive governance of a cooperative building. See Schill et
al., supra note 178, at 283.
On the concept of the control premium in the corporate law context, see Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 705
(1982).  Thank you to Ryan Bubb for pointing me to this article.
185 Another illustration of the value that people attach to outright ownership is the
concern that some people have that autonomy is being undermined in the digital age
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Debates in nineteenth century North America about land tenure also
suggest that the fee simple has historically been valued for the independence
and autonomy that it provides, as well as for economic reasons.  As already
mentioned, the fee simple developed gradually out of the system of feudal
landholdings established in England after the Norman Conquest.186  The
British imported the fee simple when they colonized large parts of North
America, and displaced the resident indigenous peoples.187  But British land
tenure policies were complicated, and the British also allocated land using
other legal forms, including proprietary estates.188  Some of these estates
endured in Canada—and even the United States—decades after the Ameri-
can Revolution.189  During the nineteenth century, tenants where these
estates persisted sought government assistance in transforming leaseholds
into fee simple ownership, engendering contentious political debates about
the sanctity of property rights in land. The proponents of fee simple owner-
ship argued for it on economic and noneconomic grounds.
Consider the nineteenth century debate about “the ‘Land Question’” in
what is now Prince Edward Island (PEI), Canada.  After the British obtained
PEI from the French in 1763, they divided “the entire Island” into 67 lots.190
Then, they used a lottery to allocate 66 of them to “Crown favorites,” many of
whom remained absentee landlords living in the United Kingdom.191  The
proprietors “were required to settle their lands within ten years with one
Protestant settler for every two hundred acres, and to pay quit rents to the
Crown,” although many of the proprietors did not satisfy their obligations.192
Working through agents, the proprietors leased out their lands for terms that
“varied . . . from a few to a thousand years.”193  This leasehold system lasted
because people are acquiring licenses rather than ownership when they digitally purchase
books, music and movies and other goods. See AARON PERZANOWSKI & JASON SCHULTZ, THE
END OF OWNERSHIP 10–11 (2016).
186 SIMPSON, supra note 18; STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 18, § 1.6, at 15–20.
187 STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 18, § 1.7, at 20–21.
188 McCallum, supra note 177, at 361.
189 Id. at 361, 365–68 n.11; see also REEVE HUSTON, LAND AND FREEDOM: RURAL SOCIETY,
POPULAR PROTEST, AND PARTY POLITICS IN ANTEBELLUM NEW YORK 13 (2000); Eric Kades,
The End of the Hudson Valley’s Peculiar Institution: The Anti-Rent Movement’s Politics, Social Rela-
tions, and Economics, 27 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 941 (2002) (reviewing HUSTON, supra, and
CHARLES W. MCCURDY, THE ANTI-RENT ERA IN NEW YORK POLITICS 1839–1865 (2001)).
190 McCallum, supra note 177, at 361; see also id. at 360.
191 Matthew George Hatvany, Tenant, Landlord, and the New Middle Class: Settlement,
Society, and Economy in Early Prince Edward Island, 1798–1848, at 2 (Ph.D thesis, Univ. of
Me., 1996); see also McCallum, supra note 177, at 360–61.
192 McCallum, supra note 177, at 361; see also id. at 362 (“[N]one of the proprietors
complied with the conditions for settlement in their original grants, either as stated ini-
tially or as modified from time to time in response to proprietorial pleas of hardship.”).
193 Id. at 361.  Matthew Hatvany, a geographer and historian, argues that the duration
of leases varied over time; leases in the early period of British rule were longer than leases
offered later.  However, Hatvany also emphasizes that leases generally were quite long—
according to the 1841 census, “more than 75% of all tenants possessed leases in
perpetuity”—and on this basis he concludes that “only for a minority of the tenantry dur-
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for over a hundred years until 1875, when the Island’s government forced
the remaining proprietors “to sell their land to the government” in exchange
for compensation determined by a commission.194
Legal historian Margaret McCallum has helpfully analyzed the argu-
ments made for switching from leasehold to fee simple ownership in PEI “in
the 1860s and 1870s.”195  Alluding to the economic argument that the fee
simple promotes investment, the critics of the leasehold system maintained
that it “stifled initiative.”196  They argued that “[t]enants had no incentive to
improve their holdings, or to produce much beyond the mere means of sub-
sistence, when all surplus went to pay rent, and their farms ultimately would
revert to the landlord.”197  Alongside their economic arguments, the oppo-
nents of the leasehold system also advocated for freehold because it would
promote the independence of tenants.  For example, McCallum writes that:
An Islander who farmed both freehold and leasehold property told the 1875
Land Commission: “People will make sacrifices to get clear of the hateful
name of paying rent.  The very name of paying rent stings so badly that a
person would not buy a leased farm, but would run away to another that is
free.”198
Proponents of freehold ownership emphasized that the “insecurity” that
leaseholds generated among tenants not only affected them personally, but
ing the first half of the 19th century was the duration of the lease truly a substantial cause
for anxiety.”  Matthew Hatvany, The Proprietary Burden?, 44 ISLAND MAG. 3, 4 (1998).
194 McCallum, supra note 177, at 365.
195 Id. at 359.  McCallum identifies four categories of arguments; the discussion above
does not do justice to the breadth of arguments that she mentions.  One tenant argument I
do not highlight in the text is a Lockean labor argument, a form of argument that also was
used to displace indigenous peoples from their lands.  According to the argument, while
the proprietors had formal title to much of the Island’s land, the land properly belonged
to the tenants because they had cleared and cultivated it, while the (often absentee) pro-
prietors had defaulted on their obligations. Id. at 371–76.
A note on terminology: McCallum uses the term “freehold’ to describe the form of
ownership that tenants and their supporters sought in PEI.  By freehold, she is referring to
fee simple ownership. See id. at 387 nn.18–19 (referencing legislation that includes the
term “fee simple”).  In this paragraph, I follow McCallum’s terminology and use
“freehold.”
196 Id. at 369.
197 Id.  Hatvany argues that while the leasehold system has often been blamed for PEI’s
underdevelopment in the nineteenth century, the system was only one contributing factor.
He maintains that there were variations in the extent to which tenants were burdened by
the leasehold system, and that
[u]pon further exploration of these issues, we may well find that the rent and
lease were not the real burden of the proprietary system.  More likely, it was the
concept of paying rent in a continent where freehold tenure was perceived as the
norm that was odious to tenants at that time—and to historians ever since!
Hatvany, supra note 193, at 7; see also Matthew G. Hatvany, Tenant, Landlord and Historian: A
Thematic Review of the “Polarization” Process in the Writing of 19th-century Prince Edward Island
History, 27 ACADIENSIS 109 (1997).
198 McCallum, supra note 177, at 368.
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also distorted the Island’s politics, because tenants “lacked the independence
necessary to exercise the franchise according to their own judgment and
will.”199  The argument was that “[t]enants who were liable to eviction at the
termination of their leases, or when they fell into arrears, were vulnerable to
pressure from landlords or their agents to vote according to the landlords’ or
agents’ instructions.”200
While PEI appears to have been unique because the British allocated
most of the Island through a leasehold system, parts of New York State also
were covered with leaseholds in the nineteenth century.  The New York State
leasehold estates “originated in the seventeenth and eighteenth century land
grants of the Dutch and English colonial governments.”201  “While some
grantees sold their lands, others created”202 interests known as “leases in
fee.”203  These were different than the leases in PEI; as the name implies,
they were an amalgam of a fee simple (because the tenant held “an open-
ended inheritable term”), and a leasehold (because tenants were required to
pay rent perpetually).204  Landlords also used “leases in lives, which gave
tenants rights to the land for as long as one, two, or three people named in
the lease . . . survived,”205 and terms of years; in time, perpetual leases were
replaced in some areas with annual leases.206  Starting in 1839, tenants ral-
lied against landlords in an “anti-rent movement” that sought to change
leaseholds to outright fee simple ownership.207  Although New York State
never abolished the leasehold system as PEI did, leaseholds gradually were
replaced with fee simples208 as many tenants “bought out their landlord.”209
As in PEI, some of the arguments against the leasehold arrangements were
economic, with critics maintaining that they discouraged investment because
tenants could not be certain that they would reap the rewards of their
labors.210  But the fee simple also was associated with freedom.211  Historian
Reeve Huston argues that “[t]he anti-renters of the 1840s placed [the] idea”
“that landownership was the only sure basis for human freedom” “at the
199 Id. at 370.
200 Id.  Freehold ownership was not a requirement for eligibility to vote in colonial PEI.
Id. at 369–70.  For discussion of how landlords in late eighteenth and early nineteenth
century New York State “controlled tenants’ votes” and influenced politics in the State, see
HUSTON, supra note 189, at 30, 112.
201 HUSTON, supra note 189, at 13.
202 Id.
203 Kades, supra note 189, at 942.
204 Id.  Tenants were also required to make payments to their landlords upon sales of
land, although these requirements eventually were abolished following a decision by the
New York Court of Appeals. Id. at 955; see also HUSTON, supra note 189, at 27, 195–96.
205 HUSTON, supra note 189, at 23.
206 Id. at 79.
207 Kades, supra note 189, at 945.
208 Id. at 946–47, 952; see also HUSTON, supra note 189, at 199–200.
209 Kades, supra note 189, at 948; see also HUSTON, supra note 189, at 191, 198, 200,
202–03.
210 HUSTON, supra note 189, at 141–42; Kades, supra note 189, at 957.
211 See, e.g., HUSTON, supra note 189, at 107–29.
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center of their movement.”212  As an example, he refers to an antirent leader
“boast[ing in the 1880s] . . . that the movement had allowed tenants to buy
their farms ‘in fee absolute.’  Thus each tenant ‘could sit under his own vine
and fig tree of his own planting with no one to make him afraid of being
disturbed or driven off.’”213
There is a danger of distorting history when using it in the service of a
normative argument.  So, it bears recognizing that land had a different
resonance in nineteenth century North America than it does today.  Then,
the “yeoman” farmer was celebrated as the backbone of society, and a much
larger share of the population was engaged in agriculture than today.214  But
some of the arguments used in the debates in PEI and New York State, in
which the very issue was whether to shift to fee simple ownership, emphasize
that there is a basis for thinking of the fee simple as having noneconomic as
well as economic benefits.  The premium paid for condominiums compared
with cooperatives in New York City suggests that these benefits persist into
our highly urbanized age.
CONCLUSION
Fennell and Posner & Weyl have done a great service by drawing atten-
tion to the potential that the dominant form of private landownership may
be a barrier to repurposing land to meet today’s needs, because it grants
owners a perpetual monopoly to exclude others and new uses.  In major cit-
ies like New York, housing prices have risen tremendously and many people
are being priced out of the market.  More affordable housing is needed to
meet the demand, and building more housing will require assembling and
212 Id. at 111; see also id. at 112 (“Anti-renters believed that proprietors’ ability to strip
others of the fruits of their labor gave them an unnatural degree of power, which
threatened tenants’ personal liberty.  Proprietors subjected entire communities to their
whim . . . .”).
Huston emphasizes that the antirenters’ “vision” of a “free society” built on indepen-
dent landholding did not extend to women, African Americans, or aboriginal peoples. Id.
at 125–29, 200 (internal quotation marks omitted).
213 Id. at 208.  For an invocation of the same passage from Micah by antirenters during
the 1840s, see id. at 111.
The antirent movement also offered other arguments against leaseholds in New York
State.  For example, as in PEI, the antirenters advanced the Lockean-labor argument that
tenants should have title to the land because they worked it. See, e.g., id. at 111–12, 114–15,
199.
214 Id. at 114; McCallum, supra note 177, at 368; see also Associated Press, Farm Popula-
tion Lowest Since 1850s, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/20/
us/farm-population-lowest-since-1850-s.html (referring to data that “about 72 percent of
the American work force” was engaged in “farm occupations” in 1820, and that “farm peo-
ple made up . . . about 64 percent” of American workers in 1850 (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
One of the themes of Fennell’s critique of the fee simple is that it is better suited to a
“low-density agrarian society” than high-density urban areas.  Fennell, supra note 1, at 1481. R
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redeveloping existing land because, as the saying goes, we are not growing
more land—and in fact, with sea level rise, we may be losing buildable land.
But the Chicago critique and the critics’ reform proposals discount the
benefits of the fee simple.  While the perpetual monopoly that the fee simple
grants may inhibit transfers to higher value uses, that monopoly also has eco-
nomic advantages to offset its disadvantages.  Moreover, no one that I have
spoken with would like to live in the world that Posner & Weyl envisage,
where our real property—and everything else we own—could be taken away
from us at any moment by someone willing to pay a price that we put on
these things, probably late at night after getting the children to bed, in the
shadow of a property tax.  Fennell’s proposals for callblocks and floating fees
are less worrisome, because she proposes them as supplements to the fee
simple instead of outright replacements of it.  But neither Fennell nor Pos-
ner & Weyl fully acknowledge the loss in independence and autonomy that
would flow from implementing their proposals.  The fee simple may impede
the transfer of land to its highest value use, but the form of landownership
not only affects what uses we make of land but also our sense of ourselves as
human beings.  All of these ideas for overhauling landownership may be cre-
ative, and I do not intend to discourage experimentation with different forms
of land tenure.  But we should be careful about adopting policies that would
leave many of us with less sense of control over our lives, and more vulnera-
ble to the whims of those with capital to spend on buying land.  We also
should work to spread the benefits of ownership to those who do not cur-
rently enjoy them.
